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Microgrid Availability during Natural Disasters 
 
Vaidyanathan Krishnamurthy, PhD 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Alexis Kwasinski 
 
A common issue with the power grid during natural disasters is low availability. 
Many critical applications that are required during and after natural disasters, for rescue 
and logistical operations require highly available power supplies. Microgrids with 
distributed generation resources along with the grid provide promising solutions in order 
to improve the availability of power supply during natural disasters. However, distributed 
generators (DGs) such as diesel gensets depend on lifelines such as transportation 
networks whose behavior during disasters affects the genset fuel delivery systems and as 
a result affect the availability. Renewable sources depend on natural phenomena that 
have both deterministic as well as stochastic aspects to their behavior, which usually 
results in high variability in the output. Therefore DGs require energy storage in order to 
make them dispatchable sources. The microgrids availability depends on the availability 
characteristics of its distributed generators and energy storage and their dependent 
infrastructure, the distribution architecture and the power electronic interfaces.  This 
dissertation presents models to evaluate the availability of power supply from the various 
distributed energy resources of a microgrid during natural disasters. The stochastic 
behavior of the distributed generators, storage and interfaces are modeled using Markov 
processes and the effect of the distribution network on availability is also considered. The 
presented models supported by empirical data can be hence used for microgrid planning. 
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 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
MOTIVATION: 
Low reliability of the power system during and after natural disasters is of great 
concern as many critical applications such as hospitals and communication systems 
require a highly reliable power supply especially in the wake of a natural disaster. Also 
recent natural disasters like Super storm Sandy in 2012 and the Japanese earthquake of 
2011, have raised doubts about the capability of conventional power grids to sustain 
operation of important services such as communications, rescue, oil refining and make 
sure they are not interrupted during disasters and in their aftermath. The common 
experience during disasters like tropical cyclones is that conventional power grids are 
fragile systems in which damage to less than 1% of their components can lead to 
extensive high-incidence outages [Fahimi et al. 2011] and it is likely that the grid is 
unavailable at the critical load mains tie and its neighboring area for several weeks. This 
fragility can be attributed to the bulk power grid’s large geographical layout, combined 
with their centralized generation and control architectures. Examples for such cases are 
observed during hurricanes Katrina [Kwasinski et al. 2009] and Ike, the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake in China [Tang 2008] and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Fig. 1.1 
shows a telecommunication base station in Gilchrist, TX after Hurricane Ike in 2008. The 
main power at this site was out for about 2 weeks. The site had a diesel genset which had 
a capacity of 48 hours and a battery backup of 8 hours. The only road providing access to 
the site was unusable for about a week.   
 2 
 
Fig. 1.1 Telecommunication base station after Hurricane Ike 2008. 
Low reliability of the grid can be attributed to a number of reasons. Major factors 
that contribute to the low availability of the grid are its centralized control, inefficiencies 
introduced due to operation coordination over extensive area, aging components, 
insufficient or inhomogeneous infrastructure distribution which leads to insufficient 
generation and/or congestion, lack of active elements in transmission and distribution 
systems, lack of diverse power alternatives, lack of redundant paths in sub-transmission 
and distribution systems. Additionally, due to higher penetration of advanced loads, such 
as PHEVs availability issues are increased. Interdependencies between various lifelines 
can also introduce some availability issues and these issues become more prominent 
during extreme events like natural disasters. Such observations can be made in two 
prominent natural disasters of recent times such as the Chilean earthquake of 2010 and 
the Japanese earthquake of 2011[TCLEE 2012, Dueñas-Osorio and Kwasinski 2010]. 
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Improving Power supply availability 
Multiple solutions are possible in order to improve the power supply availability. 
They can be broadly classified into two major types:  
1) Utility side solutions, which involve grid hardening techniques. 
2) User side solutions, which include back-up or standby generators, energy 
storage, such as batteries, or in general, local generation in the form of microgrids, which 
is the primary focus of this dissertation.  
MICROGRIDS 
Overview 
Microgrids have been prescribed as a way to improve power supply availability 
during natural disasters [Kwasinski et al. 2012]. Microgrids can be defined as follows:  
Micro-grids are locally confined and independently controlled electric power 
grids in which a distribution network with a given architecture integrates distributed 
energy resources (DERs) with the loads.  
That is integration of local distributed generators and energy storage devices and 
loads. A key fundamental difference with respect to conventional grids is that micro-grids 
add active network components at the distribution level of a power grid that provide more 
operational flexibility and reduce conventional power grids vulnerabilities caused by 
centralized generation and control architectures and long distances between power 
sources and loads.  
Though a large spread of power outages are observed after many natural disasters, 
such as hurricanes, earthquakes and tsunamis, damage assessments indicate that areas 
with intense infrastructure and dwellings damage are generally a much smaller area than 
that observed with high-incidence power grid outages. Moreover, the damage distribution 
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is very inhomogeneous and with abrupt variations in the damage severity i.e. it is very 
common to find a zone with extreme damage surrounded just a few meters away by areas 
with little damage. These are two important observations that support the use of micro-
grids to power electric loads during disasters from a user perspective because the 
fundamental problem for electricity consumers is the lack of powering alternatives—i.e. 
lack of diversity—to continuously power their loads other than conventional grids or 
stand-by power systems—commonly, diesel gensets. These stand-by systems also have 
reliability issues, such as a relatively high failure to start probability for gensets that 
limits stand-by power plants availability to about 0.9999 or 4-nines [Kwasinski 2011a] 
and the possibility that the microgrid components can themselves be damaged. These 
damages can be prevented by locating the sources strategically so that the chances of 
damage are very low and has been demonstrated in some cases.  For example, during the 
earthquake and tsunami of March 2011 in Japan, a micro-grid in Sendai [Hirose et al. 
2006] was able to maintain operation by powering its local loads shown in Fig. 1.2. 
Another notable example is the Verizon central office in Garden City, New York shown 
in Fig. 1.3 
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Fig. 1.2 Sendai NTT microgrid 
 
Fig. 1.3. Microgrid in Garden City 
 
 6 
Availability issues with Microgrids. 
There are some other potential sources of problems that have been little explored 
in the past. Many microgrids generation technologies, such as engine generators or 
microturbines, depend on infrastructures called lifelines, such as roads or natural gas 
distribution networks. These lifelines may be affected by the disasters just like 
conventional grids. Energy storage may be used to reduce the lifeline dependencies as 
demonstrated in [Kwasinski 2011a] and another option is to rely on renewable energy 
sources, such as photovoltaic modules or wind turbines that do not depend on a lifeline. 
But there are limitations regarding the use of renewables because of their large footprints 
and sites may have limited space or relatively high power demand and the variable output 
of the renewables limits the application of renewable energy sources. Energy storage can 
again be used to address this variability issue as in the case of the lifelines but this added 
energy storage cost can significantly increase the micro-grid capital cost with respect to 
the micro-grid design intended for operation during normal conditions because well 
designed micro-grids may not have significant requirements in terms of energy storage in 
order to reach high availabilities [Kwasinski et al. 2012]. In order to make microgrids 
work as a reliable power supply alternative, the behavior of all the DERs, storage and 
lifelines put together must be understood. This research is intended toward the 
development of models, supported by data of recent natural disasters to understand the 
performance of microgrids under extreme events. The analysis here will focus on 
problems motivated by critical loads, which could be military bases, data centers, or 
hospitals, which require very high power availability because their downtime costs tend 
to be high. A better understanding of microgrid performance during natural disasters 
considering its various interdependencies and storage can function as a valuable tool for 
planners and operators of power supplies for critical loads. 
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Problem Statement: 
The primary problem addressed in this dissertation is to develop models to 
calculate the availability of a microgrid during natural disasters i.e. find the probability 
that the loads served by a microgrid can be supported by the various resources available 
to the microgrid during a natural disaster. 
Approach: 
Figure 1.4 shows a simplified schematic of a typical microgrid considered for the 
analysis, which could have an ac, dc, or hybrid distribution system. It can be seen that all 
the loads and DERs are on the micro-grid side of the power electronic interface 
separating the grid from the micro-grid.  
 
Fig. 1.4. General representation of a microgrid. 
This interface acts as a boundary that provides electrical confinement to the 
microgrid and enables the analysis of the components in relative isolation. It also allows 
such a microgrid to meet interconnection standards [ieee1547] and operate in an island 
mode enhancing local power supply availability during natural disasters when grid 
outages are expected to happen [Kennedy 2009]. 
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During natural disasters, microgrids are expected to operate in island mode and 
therefore, the power supply availability is predominately influenced by the microgrid’s 
DERs performance [Tanrioven 2005]. The analysis will focus on the DERs and their 
availability dependency on the local energy storage and lifelines. As part of the analysis, 
evaluation of lifeline performance during natural disasters and their impact on micro-
grids availability is also proposed. In order to construct the availability model, discrete 
time Markov chains are used to describe the evolution between the various failed and 
working states of the microgrid components as well as describing the evolution of the  
amount of energy in each storage unit of the microgrid.  
CONTRIBUTIONS: 
A key contribution of this research is representing the effect of two critical 
aspects affecting micro-grid availability during natural disasters and in their aftermath: 
lifelines performance and local energy storage contribution. The impact of energy storage 
on the DERs availability can be used as a measure of analyzing the dependency and 
energy storage can be used in reducing the dependency of the DERs performance on the 
lifelines performance in natural disasters. In chapter 5, this dissertation presents the 
modeling of the behavior of diesel gensets under deterministic and stochastic loads with 
fuel arrival facing delays with finite fuel storage capacity. 
Another contribution of this research is the characterization of hurricane-caused 
power systems outages through the developed localized tropical cyclone intensity indices 
that enables power grid planners and operators to perform risk assessments in order to 
evaluate different infrastructure deployment alternatives or anticipate logistical needs 
during the recovery period after a tropical cyclone affects a given area.  
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Using the developed intensity indices, this dissertation derives a Markov chain 
model to calculate the main grid availability under various tropical cyclones conditions, 
which can help users plan and schedule various resources required for the operations 
during and in the aftermath of the natural disaster. 
Finally, a major contribution of the dissertation is that it develops a framework for 
calculating the availability of a microgrid given its distribution architecture in the 
presence of various interfaces that forms part of the power management system or in the 
case of smart grids, also performs the role of power routing systems.   
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the 
behavior of the main power grid during natural disasters. Chapter 2 discusses the 
characterization of power system outage caused by tropical cyclones and Chapter 3 
discusses the grid availability modeling at the main ties for a microgrid. 
Chapter 4 provides a broad overview of the various distributed energy resources 
of a microgrid for their use in disaster conditions and develops the availability model for 
renewable energy power supply systems and the effects of storage on the availability is 
discussed. 
In Chapter 5, the modeling of the diesel genset availability with storage and 
transportation delays is discussed. 
In Chapter 6, the models developed for the DERs in the preceding chapters are 
used and the microgrid availability model is developed considering the distribution 
architecture of the microgrid and the various interfaces present in the microgrid 
distribution and results are discussed. 
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Using the availability models developed in the previous chapters, Chapter 7 
presents cases studies for information and communication technology facilities during 
hurricanes. The availability models are validated using the empirical observations from 
hurricanes Katrina, Ike and Sandy considering the diesel fuel, and grid outages during 
these storms for central offices, cell sites and digital loop carriers. 
 Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation with important conclusions that 
can be drawn from the models that were developed in Chapters 2 to 7 and discusses the 
scope for future work.  
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Chapter 2: Characterization of Outages Caused by Tropical Cyclones 
This chapter discusses characterization of hurricane-caused outages in power 
systems through simple to calculate indices that represent hurricane intensity. With the 
proposed indices, power grid planners can perform risk assessments in order to evaluate 
different infrastructure deployment alternatives [Kwasinski et al. 2009] or system 
operators may anticipate logistical needs during the recovery period after a hurricane 
affects a given area. There are various methods to calculate hurricane intensity, such as 
the Saffir-Simpson (SS) scale [Saffir-Simpson], the National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) experimental Saffir-Simpson scale [Saffir-
Simpson], Hurricane Hazard Index (HHI) [Kantha 2006], Hurricane Surge Index (HSI) 
[Kantha 2006], generalized linear models [Liu et al .2007], generalized additive models 
[Han et al .2009], accelerated failure time models [Liu et al .2009a] and models using the 
Integrated Kinetic Energy [Hebert 2009] and various topological and statistical analysis 
in [Winkler et al. 2010-Galvan et al. 2009]. Due to its simplicity based on a five-level—
or categories of which Category 1 [Kantha 2006] is the lowest, the SS scale has been the 
most popular method to measure hurricane intensity. Although the SS scale has been used 
many times to anticipate potential damage from a hurricane [Kantha 2006], it presents, 
however, inconsistencies when trying to use it as a way to assess the damaging potential 
of a hurricane on networked infrastructure, such as the power grid and 
telecommunications networks. Issues with this scale were discussed in [Kantha 2006] 
such as quantization errors that lead to incorrect classifications of vastly different 
hurricanes into the same category. The most devastating hurricane effects are caused by 
the storm surge [NOAA Surge], which is a body of water forced inland by the hurricane. 
The SS scale estimates expected surge levels for a hurricane of a given category but this 
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estimation is not very reliable as the scale fails to take into account many other factors 
that affect the storm surge, such as topographic characteristics [Kantha 2006] and 
hurricane atmospheric pressure and size [Kantha 2006]. Two notable examples are Ike 
(2008) which made landfall as a Category-2 hurricane [Saffir-Simpson] and Katrina 
(2005) [Kwasinski et al. 2009] which made landfall as a Category 3 hurricane and 
affected New Orleans with winds of a Category 1 storm, but their storm surge levels were 
in the range of a category 4 or 5 hurricane. 
Of the other indices different from the SS, the HHI and HSI are only applicable 
over a large area spanning the entire storm diameter. The HHI is based on the total 
energy dissipated by the storm and the HSI calculates storm surge intensity based on the 
central pressure drop and multiplies it by the storm radius, which does not give any 
indication of the surge intensity in a specific area. In order to provide information on 
smaller geographical resolutions required for analyzing power system outages there is a 
need to develop indices that can be applied to scales smaller than the storm radius. The 
HHI considers the damaging potential of a hurricane to be proportional to the size of the 
hurricane, but Andrew (1992) which was a very intense hurricane in terms of localized 
infrastructure damage, was a small hurricane [NOAA 1999]. Reference [Zhu et al. 2007] 
discusses prediction of outages via storm surge modeling and [Powell et al.] explores 
wind destructive potential and surge destructive potential. Both models consider the total 
energy contained in the wind field but a priori there is no direct relation that indicates 
how the restoration process and average outage duration would be affected. Also, 
resiliency models developed in [Reed et al. 2009] using quality curves defined in 
[Bruneau] are limited to wind speeds. The effect of hurricanes on transmission lines have 
been studied in [Zhou 2006], [Liu and Singh 2009] and time varying failure rates have 
been generally studied [Moon et al. 2006], [Retterath et al. 2004] in order to analyze 
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distribution systems reliability. However, these studies do not provide a simple approach 
to estimate potential effects of hurricanes that could be used in a practical setting to plan 
network deployments or logistics. 
This chapter presents indices that allow characterizing hurricane intensity with 
respect to the outages they cause on power grids. The goal is to develop indices that 
consider all relevant hurricane-damaging actions that are also simple to calculate. 
Initially, this chapter follows the approach in [Kantha 2006] and presents a General 
Localized Tropical Cyclone Intensity Index (GLTCII) that considers hurricane energy 
content and the time a given site is at least under tropical storm winds—maximum 1–
minute average sustained winds at 10 meters above the surface between 39 and 73 mph. 
The study follows a classical empirical approach based on statistics from relevant 
hurricanes from the 2004, 2005 and 2008 Atlantic seasons: Charley, Dolly, Dennis, 
Frances, Jeanne, Gustav, Ike, Ivan, Katrina, Rita and Wilma. Power systems outage data 
are from the states of Texas, Louisiana and Florida. Pseudo confidence bands for each of 
the indices are provided. Results are interpreted within the context of the 2008 hurricanes 
Dolly, Gustav and Ike. 
OUTAGE METRICS AND DATA VALIDATION 
Outage Metrics: 
One of the limitations found with the study of power systems outages during 
tropical storms or hurricanes is that commonly used outage metrics, such as those 
specified in IEEE 1366 [IEEE 1366], may be difficult to apply because those metrics 
refer only to distribution portions of the grid and because outages caused by tropical 
cyclones are considered to occur during a major event day, and, thus, they are excluded 
from all statistics. That is, metrics in IEEE 1366 may not represent well outage 
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characteristics during hurricanes. Hence, this work first introduces relevant outage 
metrics that are used in the analysis generated by tropical storm or hurricane conditions. 
In reality, the introduced outage metrics fit into those indicated in IEEE 859 [IEEE 859]. 
In order to provide consistency with the obtained outage data, outage metrics are 
considered for each county (or parish in the case of Louisiana). The outage metrics 
considered in this work are the maximum outage incidence percentage O%max,j: the 
restoration time Tr,τ %;j: and the average outage duration Mj: A more detailed description 
of these metrics is provided next. 
 
Fig. 2.1.  Area where all the power infrastructure was destroyed (Gilchrist, TX). 
Maximum Outage Incidence: 
This metric indicates the maximum number or percentage of electricity customers that 
lost power in county j. Consider that a county j is affected by hurricane h that causes 
outages. Outage data are first available at time tstart,h,j and last available at time tend,h,j. 
During the time interval T|h,s = [tstart,h,j, tend,h,j], the number of customers without power in 
county j increases during a few hours until reaching a peak and then they decrease over 
several days. This varying number of outages in the sampled time t is Oj(t). Thus, the 
maximum number of outages in county j during hurricane h and its aftermath is given by 
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Thus, if Bj represents the total number of customers in county j, then the 
maximum outage incidence percentage O%max,j is 
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Restoration times: 
 They are the times needed to restore τ% of the maximum number of outages in county j 
since those outages first peak. The absolute restoration time, trest,τ%,j, for an τ% restoration 
and computed from the initial time tstart,h,j is defined as 
 )})01.01()(:min{ max,%,, jjjrest OtOtt      (2.3)  
The relative restoration time Tr,τ%  with respect to the time tmax,j when Omax,j 
occurs is 
Tr,τ% = trest,τ%,j - tmax,j    (2.4) 
Observations during damage assessments after hurricanes Katrina, Dolly, Gustav, 
and Ike helped to properly consider some practical complexities in restoration time data 
and to provide additional empirical context to the analysis. One of these complexities is 
found in areas such as Gilchrist in Texas under the influence of Hurricane Ike in 2008, 
where all or almost all of the customers were lost from the hurricane (Fig. 2.1). These are, 
typically, relatively small areas affected by the hurricane storm surge. In these cases, the 
damage assessments indicate that power grid infrastructure can be completely rebuilt 
within 45 days after the hurricane. This restoration time limit was even observed in areas 
flooded by Hurricane Katrina, where loads could have been restored in about 3 weeks 
after the flood waters were drained within 3 to 4 weeks after the storm. Since overhead 
distribution lines were not excessively damaged in the flooded areas,, most of the long 
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restoration times were caused by damage caused in substations that were submerged in 
flood waters. The other of these complexities were caused by a second or, as it happened 
in Florida in 2004, a third hurricane affecting the same area before enough outages were 
restored, or before the infrastructure was restored to the same condition it had before the 
first hurricane struck the area—i.e., that only temporary repairs were made before a 
subsequent hurricane affected the area. The result of temporary repairs made immediately 
after a first—or primary—hurricane affected an area is that both outage incidence and 
restoration times of the hurricanes that followed—secondary or tertiary hurricanes—are 
not reliable data because the power grid infrastructure is in a more vulnerable condition 
than when the first hurricane struck. Hence, in these cases, data for the primary 
hurricanes and secondary or tertiary hurricanes are separated and only data from the 
primary hurricanes are considered in the analysis.  
Average outage duration:  
This metric indicates the average duration of an outage in county j. The average 
outage duration Mj for a county j is defined as 
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where fj(t) is a continuous non-negative function that approximates the evolution 
of the outage profile for each county. Two possible curve interpolation approaches were 
used for each available county outage data based on the best R
2
 value: cubic splines or 
exponential curves.  
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Data Validation 
Total number of customers: 
 Ideally, the total number of customers reported in each county or parish is 
expected to remain constant in all reports filed by the utilities for a same hurricane. 
However, data show differences in the total number of customers in different reporting 
periods. There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy in the total number 
of customers. The most common ones are miscommunications due to the difficult 
conditions in which utilities operate during and after a hurricane, errors in records, 
different reporting practices—e.g. reporting the total number of customers in affected 
feeders instead of total number of customers in all feeders in an affected county—and 
other operational and logistical priorities preceding outage reporting. Thus, outage data 
was evaluated for consistency in order to keep only those data points that could be 
considered valid based on a simple-to-test objective criteria. First, a total number of 
customers for each county needs to be considered. Hence, the total number of customers 
in each county was calculated as       



jk
kjj tBB
K
))(max( ,           (2.6) 
where Bj,k(t) is the number of reported customers in county j for utility k at time t 
and Kj the set of all utilities in county j.  
Ratio test:  
This simple test implemented in order to validate outage data, required that in 
each county the total number of electricity customers must be at least greater than the 
total number of housing units Γj indicated in [US Census 2008]. Data points not meeting 
this condition were discarded. Thus, the equation that represents the test performed to 
check each data point validity is: 
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where γ = 1. This selection for γ was considered to be a reasonably good 
compromise choice between having some data points with relatively small errors in the 
value for Bj and reducing the confidence in the statistical significance of the remaining 
data by eliminating an excessive number of data points that do not pass (2.7). That is, in 
the limit case when Bj = Γj the relative error er made by considering that the total number 
of customers is the value Bj contained in the outage data instead of the actual value Bj
*
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Evidently, as γ is reduced, the relative error increases. Hence, γ could be increased 
above 1 in order to consider the contribution of industrial customers. However, the ratio 
of residential to industrial customers may change significantly from county to county so 
data processing becomes extremely complex and more prone to errors. Another issue 
with selecting γ > 1 relates with the fact that part of the problem to be solved here is a 
non linear least squares regression problem that attempts to find a curve that fits the 
outage observations. In order to numerically solve this part of the problem a trust-region-
reflective algorithm was used. For a more numerically stable solution, it was found that 
the ratio of the number of data points to the number of parameters that define the fit curve 
needs to be greater than 10. But, as γ is increased fewer data points pass the test and the 
regression curves obtained in the analysis are less reliable than those obtained with a 
larger set of data points, even when some of these points may include some small relative 
error in Bj. Thus, it was found that a value of γ equal to 1 provides a reasonably good 
compromise solution between considering an exact number of electricity customers and 
using enough data points in order to find a suitable curve fit.  
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 HURRICANE ACTIONS INFLUENCING OUTAGES 
Four hurricane actions that influence outage incidence and/or duration are 
considered: storm surge, wind speed, size, and duration under at least tropical storm 
conditions. These actions may influence outage metrics from the damage they directly 
cause or from the influence they have in restoration logistic operations. 
Storm Surge H: 
A storm surge is a large volume of water that the hurricane forces inland. From 
[Tankut] the force acting on the objects by a surge of water of height H is proportional to 
H
2
. Hence, its energy per unit length can be considered proportional to H
2
. Storm surge 
effects are measured with respect to a reference value H0 that is considered equal to 4 
feet, which is the typical minimal storm surge of a category 1 hurricane. Since any 
changes in water level within the range 0 to H0 would yield minor differences in damages 
to electrical infrastructure, then for all Hi ≤ H0 the ratio Hi/H0 = 1, where Hi is the storm 
surge height at location i. Beyond the reference level, severity of storm surge effects on 
electrical equipment and supporting structures rapidly increases. Some of the highest 
recorded surges for the data set used for the analysis were about 16 feet and the outage 
incidences recorded at these points were 100%.  
In the analysis presented here and for the locations under consideration, values for 
Hi were obtained using storm surge contour maps from NOAA’s post storm analysis 
reports [Wang et al. 2005], [FEMA 2009], except in the case of Hurricane Gustav for 
which the ADCIRC storm surge simulation [ADCIRC 2009] was used because post 
storm data was incomplete. Other methods already available or under development can 
also be used to find the impact of the surge level on the system at the required location. 
There is a considerable amount of work already being done in storm surge modeling 
[Dawson et al. 2006] [Graber et al. 2006]. These estimates can be used to sufficiently 
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evaluate the index in cases where post storm data is not available or in anticipation of a 
storm. These surge estimation techniques have been shown to be around 20% accurate 
over a mile from the point of estimation [Glahnl et al.].  
Maximum one minute sustained wind speed Vmax,i at location i 
The wind kinetic energy is proportional to the square of the wind speed [Kantha 
2006]. Since wind speed at a given point is not constant, unless indicated otherwise the 
analysis considers the value of the maximum sustained wind speed measured at 10 meters 
over the earth surface during a one-minute interval. To normalize this parameter, the 
minimum wind speed of a category 1 hurricane is used as a reference. Thus, Vmax,0 = 74 
mph. The maximum wind speed contours [Powell et al. 1998], [H*wind] indicate the 
maximum wind speeds experienced at each point over the entire storm period. These 
contours generated by 1-minute “best track” for all hurricanes and 10-minutes “best 
track” for Jeanne are used to find Vmax,i. This 10-minutes value is based on the World 
Meteorological Organization recommendation and is, typically, a slightly lower value 
than the 1-minute value used by the U.S. National Hurricane Center. 
 Time under Storm Conditions TTS,i at location i 
It has been known that the damaging potential of a hurricane is dependent on its 
translation speed [Kantha 2006]. The faster it moves, the shorter the time a given point is 
under damaging winds. Time duration under at least tropical storm conditions TTS,i is 
considered because it is about at this wind speed that logistic operations involved in 
deploying repair crews start to be affected due to safety concerns. The TTS,i  is normalized 
using a reference TTS,0 =12 hours. The wind fields are obtained from H*Wind analysis 
[Powell et al. 1998], [H*wind]. This wind field snapshots are used to find the first instant 
tfp,h,i that a location i comes under the influence of the tropical storm winds and the last 
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instant tlp,h,i that the same location i is under the influence of the tropical storm winds. 
Then, TTS is given by 
TTS,i = tlp,h,i - tfp,h,i                               (2.9) 
Note: if Vmax,i < Vth, TTS,i = 1. 
 Ah, Area swept on land by hurricane h 
Ah is the total area of land that experiences maximum wind speeds over Vth mph, 
which, in this case, it was considered equal to the lower bound of tropical storm wind 
speeds of 39 mph. The area Ah is considered here because the bigger a hurricane swept 
area is, the more complex survey and repair logistic operations are. Hence, it is 
reasonable to expect that larger hurricanes lead to longer repair times. The maximum 
wind speed contours [Powell et al. 1998], [H*wind] were used to find the area swept by a 
hurricane. Ah is normalized to a reference area A0 which is defined as the area swept by at 
least tropical storm winds of a typical category 1 hurricane with a fixed radius of 150 
miles moving at an average speed of 12.5 mph in 12 hrs therefore A0 = 35,342 mi
2
. 
Hurricane action parameters evaluation 
As mentioned earlier, outage data was available for each county or parish, 
depending on the state. However, in some cases, such as large counties, the value of each 
of the four relevant hurricane actions may change somewhat within each county or 
parish. Hence, the value considered for each hurricane action in each county is their 
weighted average with respect to the portion of the area occupied in each county or 
parish. That is, if Ij is the set of all locations in county j and the weight factor is α, then 
     
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

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jIi
iij VV max,max,             (2.11) 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
General Local Tropical Cyclone Intensity Index(GLTCII) 
On a first simple approach and based on the energy content of each hurricane 
damaging action, the GLTCII at a location i is intuitively formulated similar to that in 
[Kantha 2006] as: 
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The following R
2
 values are obtained for various outage metrics when the outage 
data was compared with the GLTCII. For O%max, R
2
 = 0.78; for Tr,95%, R
2
 = 0.5; for Tr,98%, 
R
2
 = 0.45; for M, R
2
 = 0.37. 
Regression Analysis: LTCII versus O%max,Tr and M: 
Although some of the R
2
 values yielded by (2.13) are reasonably good, regression 
analysis was used to find forms for the LTCII that yield better correlation with the curves 
that approximates the distribution of the data points. For simplicity of notation let H = x1 
= Hi/H0, V = x2 = Vmax,i/Vmax,0, T = x3 = TTS,i/TTS0, A = x4 = Ah/A0 be the normalized 
values with respect to {H0, Vth, TTS0, A0} = {4, 38, 12, 35342}. The basis function for the 
regression analysis is built as the following response surface model. 
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  (2.14) 
where ph are the coefficients that are to be found. When p18=1 and the rest of the 
coefficients are 0, (2.14) is (2.13). Other forms of (2.14) may provide better results but 
they are more complex because they involve more terms. Also, as mentioned above the 
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number of parameters that can be obtained is limited by the number of data points 
available in the data set. 
Procedure to find LTCII for each of the outage metrics: 
- Step 1: Formulate the basis: 
Let Di, be the ith observed value of the outage metric D, where D is the set of all 
outage metrics; i.e., D= {O%max, Tr,95%, Tr,98%, M}. For the maximum outage incidence—
i.e. D={O%max}—a logistic curve is proposed as a general fit based on the observed 
distribution of data points  
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where Y is the fitted curve for O%max, Li equals log(LTCIIi) and ba,  are 
parameters that need to be determined. The values for Y and O%max are percentage values 
so when they are normalized to 1 they lie in the interval [0, 1], thus k1 = 1. 
For D equal to {Tr,95%}, {Tr,98%} or {M} a third order polynomial form is proposed:  
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where Y now is the fitting curve for Tr,95%, Tr,98%, or M, Li = LTCIIi and a3, a2, a1, 
and ao are real number parameters that need to be determined. In both (2.15) and (2.16) 
the general basis for the LTCII is given in (2.14). 
- Step2: Combine Bases for LTCII and Y:  
For D = O%max let z= {a, b, p},
24p . From (2.14) and (2.15) with k1 = 1: 
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where x is the set of normalized hurricane damaging actions at a particular 
location i; i.e., x = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. 
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For D equal to {Tr,95%}, {Tr,98%} or {M}, let z = {a3, a2, a1, ao, p}, with 
24p
and using (2.14) and (2.16):  
0
3
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- Step 3: Solve for the parameters i.e. z:  
The functions LTCII, y1 and y2 are found by solving a least squares problem 
which is described by the objective function e(z) given by 
2
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Then the problem involves finding the minimum of e(z). I.e., 
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With z known, the optimum fitting curves y1 and y2 for specific indices LTCII in 
(2.15) and (2.16) can now be known. 
 Metrics for goodness of fit:  
Two metrics are used to estimate the goodness of fit of the regression curves 
obtained by the above analysis. 
 a) R
2
, the coefficient of determination.  
b) rs  
The proportion of residuals of the regression fit whose magnitude is less than s 
times the maximum observed value of the outage metric. In the analysis s = 0.2 and s = 
0.1 are used. 
Implications of the regression analysis 
Since for each outage metric D the regression analysis yields a different set p of 
coefficients p, then for each D there are different forms of LTCII within the general 
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family of LTCIIs represented by (2.14). Hence, new specific LTCII are named for each 
particular metric D. These specific LTCII are detailed next. 
LTCIIMOI:  
This is the specific LTCII for the maximum outage incidence. Points satisfying 
(2.6) and (2.7) were considered and the O%max for these points were plotted vs. 
L=log (LTCIIMOI) in Fig. 2.2. In this plot, LTCIIMOI is given by  
LTCIIMOI=111V+120V+107VA+15VHA+359V
2
T   (2.21) 
because this form was the solution for the least squares problem (2.21). That is, 
(2.21) yields the best R
2
 values for Y when considering O%max. The resulting logistic 
curve indicated by (2.15) with a = 2.6 and b = 5.8, and L = log (LTCIIMOI) with LTCIIMOI 
given in (2.21) is also shown in Fig. 2.2. The results of the curve fitting process are 
summarized in Table 2.1.. The logistic growth function obtained has an R
2
 = 0.80 and rs = 
0.83 for s = 0.2. Larger deviations from the fit occur at lower LTCIIMOI values where the 
storm is less intense and damage is expected to be milder. Yet, despite these expectations, 
wide disperse data are observed.  
Sensitivity of the maximum outages to the maximum sustained wind speeds V in a 
given location can be easily observed from the LTCIIMOI equation in (2.21) obtained from 
the regression analysis. The maximum sustained wind speeds are a common factor in the 
LTCII. Therefore, for a given set of values for the hurricane actions H, T and A, the wind 
speeds can be scaled to produce various LTCII conditions and therefore get various 
outage incidence values depending only on the wind speed. That is VLTCIIMOI . This 
makes the evaluation of the sensitivity of the LTCII and hence the maximum outage 
incidence to the hurricane wind speed a simple characterization. 
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LTCIITrτ:  
Two specific LTCII are found for the 95 % and 98 % completed restoration times. 
These LTCII obtained for the τ% restoration times are collectively called LTCIITrτ. Thus, 
for τ = 95 the index is called LTCIITr95 and for τ = 98 the index is called LTCIITr98. Using 
the basis in (2.14) and (2.16), a polynomial fit was obtained for each of the restoration 
times with R
2
 of 0.65 and r0.2=0.91 for both Tr,95% and Tr,98%. The values of a for Tr,95% are 
a ={a3,a2,a1,a0}={0, 9.0095 10
-3
, 0.2, 0}. The values of a for Tr,98% are a = 
{a3,a2,a1,a0}={0, 9.8314 10
-3
, 0.2, 0.137}. Their outcome as a result of solving the least 
squares problem is  
LTCIITr95=14V+2TA+2V
2
T    (2.22) 
LTCIITr98= 15V+2VT+TA     (2.23) 
 
Fig. 2.2  O%max vs. L  
Figure 2.3 shows the observed points for Tr,95% and the curve fit Y given by (2.16) 
versus LTCIITr95, whereas Fig. 2.4 shows the same respective information but for the 98% 
restoration time. Restoration times are influenced not only by damage intensity but also 
by “soft” factors, such as management policies, logistical strategies, and restoration 
techniques employed by utilities. This may be the fundamental reason why R
2
 results for 
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restoration times are somewhat lower than those for the outage intensity. Still, as 
anticipated, both LTCIITrτ depend on all damaging actions that are expected to influence 
logistical and restoration operations, such as hurricane size A, except for the storm surge 
height, which despite being the leading action that causes more severe damage, the 
damage is almost always limited to relatively small areas (narrow coastal strips).  
LTCIIAOD versus Average Outage Duration M:  
This is the specific LTCII for the average outage duration. Following the same 
aforementioned process, it was found that in (2.18) the fitting curve is a 3
rd
 degree 
polynomial with a = {a3, a2, a1, a0} = {0, 0, 0.28, 0} and the LTCIIAOD equal to 
LTCIIAOD=3V+4VA+4V
2
T    (2.24) 
 
Fig. 2. 3.  Tr,95% vs. LTCIITr95 
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Fig. 2.4.  Tr,98% vs. LTCIITr98 
 
Fig. 2.5.  M versus LTCIIAOD 
The metrics for goodness of the found fitting curve is R
2
 = 0.51 and r0.2 = 0.96. 
The resulting plot with observed data and fitting curve is shown in Fig. 2.5. Like both 
LTCIITrτ this LTCII depends on all damaging actions that are expected to influence 
logistical and restoration operations and it does not depend on the storm surge height. 
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CASE STUDIES 
 
Outage metric Fitting curve equation Index Equation R
2 
r0.2 r0.1 
O%max (2.15)L=log(LTCIIIMOI) (2.21) 0.80 0.83 0.7 
Tr,95% (2.16)L=LTCIIITr95 (2.22) 0.65 0.91 0.8 
Tr,98% (2.16)L=LTCIIITr98 (2.23) 0.65 0.91 0.78 
M (2.16)L=LTCIIIAOD (2.24) 0.51 0.96 0.9 
Table 2.1: Curve Fit Results: R
2
, r0.2 and r0.1 
A brief account of the outage and their corresponding LTCII for the three last 
hurricanes to directly strike the U.S. coast in 2008—Dolly, Gustav, and Ike—is presented 
in this section. In general, larger deviations of the data from the regression curves in Figs. 
2.2 to 2.5 is observed at lower values of LTCII, which occurred in fringe regions where 
storm intensity diminished and in places at the edge of the hurricane/tropical storm wind-
fields. However, the presented statistics show a remarkable high correlation considering 
the fact that, as it is going to be shown, most of the area affected by a hurricane and with 
widely varying outage incidence and restoration times show relatively very little damage.  
Dolly made landfall in Cameron County, Texas on July 23
rd
, 2008 as a Category 1 
hurricane on the SS scale with wind-speeds of 85 mph. Gustav struck Louisiana on 
September 1
st
, 2008 as a Category 2 hurricane on the SS scale with maximum sustained 
wind-speeds of 110 mph. Finally, Ike’s eye made landfall on the northern tip of 
Galveston Island in Texas on September 13
th
, 2008. At the time of landfall Ike was as a 
category 2 hurricane on the SS scale. However, its storm surge was similar to what it is 
expected in a much stronger hurricane. Dolly’s and Ike’s peak outage incidence are 
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shown in Figs. 2.6 (a) and 2.9 (a) and the variation of the log(LTCIIMOI) are shown in 
Figs. 2.6 (b) and 2.9 (b) respectively. The average outage duration maps are given in 
Figs. 2.7 (a) and 2.10 (a) and the LTCIIAOD contours are given in Figs. 2.7 (b) and 2.10 
(b), respectively. Percentage of damaged power infrastructure obtained from field 
damage assessments for Dolly and Ike are shown in Figs. 2.8 and 2.11, respectively. 
Similar maps to those shown here were also produced for Gustav. Comparison of the 
maps showing the log(LTCIIMOI) contour and the percentage of damage power 
infrastructure indicate a moderate relationship between damage to more than 1 % of the 
power grid components and values for log(LTCIIMOI) equal or higher than 7. In these 
areas the maps also show that the maximum outage incidence in almost all counties or 
parishes is higher than 95 %. However, it is also possible to observe that large variations 
of outage incidence, ranging from small percentages to total blackout, in areas where the 
percentage of damage infrastructure components is less than 1 % and where it is possible 
to observe important variations in log(LTCIIMOI). This observation leads to two important 
conclusions. The first conclusion confirms results in [Albert et al. 2004] and 
demonstrates that the electric power grid is a very fragile system in which less than 1 % 
of component failures may lead to total blackouts. The second conclusion highlights the 
merits of the indices presented here because it is possible to observe a high correlation 
(R
2
 = 0.8) between maximum outage incidence and log(LTCIIMOI) despite the fact that in 
areas with log(LTCIIMOI) less than 7 the percentage of electric grid’s damaged 
components is homogeneously small. One aspect that may contribute to this high 
correlation is based on the fact that from (2.21), log(LTCIIMOI) depends on all damaging 
actions influencing the intensity of a hurricane but none of these actions represent in an 
indirect way other factors that may affect maximum outage incidence, as it occurs with 
the restoration times, that depends not only on the grid and hurricane characteristics, but 
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they are also influenced by “soft” factors that depend on human decision processes, such 
as logistical management of the restoration process.  
          
Fig. 2.6.  Hurricane Dolly, Texas  (a) Maximum Outages  (b) log(LTCIIMOI) 
 
 
Fig. 2.7. Hurricane Dolly, Texas (a) Average Outage Duration (days) (b) LTCIIAOD 
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Fig. 2.8.  Power infrastructure damage intensity caused by Hurricane Dolly. 
Influence of indirect factors external to the hurricane or the grid characteristics 
may explain why correlation for the LTCIIAOD values is not as high as for the 
log(LTCIIMOI). In particular, logistical and management based on human decisions may 
influence restoration times and affect the uniform comparison of different hurricanes. In 
the case studies presented here, it was observed that for Gustav and Ike, LTCIIAOD values 
of 4.5 or higher relate to more than 1 % of damaged infrastructure components and 
average outage durations of about 6 days or longer. However, in Dolly it is possible to 
observe somewhat shorter outage durations for values of LTCIIAOD equal to 4.5 or higher. 
One explanation for this discrepancy can be found in the fact that restoration process with 
Dolly may have been simpler than in the case of Gustav or Ike because with Dolly there 
were fewer counties affected by the disaster. Restoration operations and logistics 
management may also contribute to produce a more dispersed outcome in terms of the 
LTCIIAOD when compared with the log(LTCIIMOI), particularly in fringe regions where the 
hurricane is dissipating or in places that are at the edge of the hurricane wind-fields. 
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Figures 2.2 and 2.4 also display points corresponding to preliminary data of some 
counties affected by Hurricane Sandy (in red squares). Numbers are used to indicate the 
following counties and boroughs: New York: Bronx 1, Brooklyn 2, Manhattan 3, Queens 
4, Staten Island 5, Nassau 6, Suffolk 7; New Jersey: Atlantic 8, Camden 9, Cape May 10, 
Cumberland 11, Hunterdon 12, Monmouth 13, Morris 14, Salem 15, Sussex 16 and 
Warren 17. In Fig. 2.2, it can be seen that points 1 to 4 corresponding to areas in New 
York City with substantial underground power infrastructure have, as expected, outage 
incidences much lower than the regression curve. Figure 2.4 shows statistically unusual 
long restoration times in some areas. Longer restoration times in areas 1, 2 and 4 may be 
explained by the high percentage of underground power facilities. However, at this point 
it is unknown the reason for the statistically longer restoration times in other areas, such 
as Long Island (points 6 and 7) where power infrastructure is mostly overhead. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has discussed the characterization of hurricane-caused power 
systems outages through localized tropical cyclone intensity indices. The analysis uses a 
empirical statistical approach based on data from the 2004, 2005 and 2008 hurricane 
seasons. Four outage metrics are defined for each county or parish: maximum outage 
incidence, 95% restoration time, 98% restoration time, and average outage duration. First, 
a generalized index GLTCII was introduced considering four relevant characteristics of a 
tropical cyclone: storm surge, maximum sustained wind speeds, size, and time of 
influence under damaging winds. Then, improved specific indices for each outage metric 
were derived through a curve fitting process that involves solving a least squares problem 
in order to find the curve parameters. These new four indices are called LTCIIMOI, 
LTCIITr95, LTCIITr98 and LTCIIAOD for each outage metric O%max, Tr,95%, Tr,98% and M 
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respectively. A high correlation with an R
2
 of 0.80 is observed in the maximum outage 
incidence, which follow a logistic curve with respect to log(LTCIIMOI). The residual r0.2 is 
evaluated to equal 0.83. These are relatively very well correlated fitting curves 
considering the fact that damage assessments have observed a relatively uniform damage 
distribution in power grids with a wide range of power outage incidence occurring with 
fewer than 1 % of the grid components damaged. The observed restoration times fit a 3
rd
 
degree polynomial with respect to LTCIITrτ with an R
2
 of 0.65. It is considered that these 
more moderate correlations observed in the regression curves for the restoration times are 
caused by the effect of external human dependent “soft” factors associated with 
restoration logistical operation management that are added to intrinsic grid characteristics 
influencing infrastructure damage intensity. The average outage duration M fits a 3
rd
 
degree polynomial with respect to LTCIIAOD with an R
2
 of 0.51 and r0.2 = 0.96. Future 
work will focus on adjusting the fitting curves considering more data points from new 
storms. 
           
Fig. 2. 9.  Hurricane Ike,Texas: (a) Maximum Outages (b) log(LTCIIMOI) 
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Fig. 2.10.  Hurricane Ike, Texas: (a) Average Outage Duration (in days) (b) LTCIIAOD  
 
 
Fig. 2.11.  Power infrastructure damage intensity caused by Hurricane Ike. 
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Chapter 3: Main Grid Availability during Tropical Cyclones 
This chapter develops a model for calculating the grid availability during tropical 
cyclones using a Markov chain. First the grid availability model using Markov chains is 
described, then the model is evaluated for historical power system outage data observed 
in hurricanes from 2004-2008 in Texas, Louisiana and Florida. 
MARKOV CHAIN MODEL OF THE GRID FOR CALCULATING GRID AVAILABILITY: 
A diagram of a power supply system that has the grid is shown in Fig. 3.1. The 
three components transmission, substation and distribution represent the collective 
infrastructure used to transport power to the load. The grid is in a working state when all 
these components are working and the grid fails when one or more of these components 
are failed.  From the perspective of the user, two states:  grid on or grid off are all that 
are required to calculate the grid availability. Traditionally, in normal operating 
conditions, the two state model is sufficient in order to characterize the grid availability. 
However during extreme condition such as tropical cyclones this is not sufficient for the 
following reasons. This 2 state model does not account for the arrival of the next hazard 
and the failure time given a certain hazard has occurred and the amount of time the 
hazardous conditions exist. Therefore here, the grid availability model is built of a single 
hazard event.  
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Fig. 3.1 Grid feeding a cell site schematic supported by a micro turbine 
 
Fig. 3.2 Markov chain state transition diagram for calculating grid availability in a 
microgrid  
 
Fig.3.3 Grid outage probability given hazard intensity 
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The 2-state grid model is modified to include the existence of an extreme event of 
a given intensity which in turn becomes a 4-state model as shown in Fig. 3.2. The state 
space with 4 states is represented using a 2 bit binary number where the MSB indicates 
the presence of a hurricane, and the second bit the state of the grid.  Therefore the first 
state indicated by 11 represents the state where there is a hurricane present and the grid is 
in the ON state. The second state 10 represents the failed grid and the presence of 
hurricane conditions. The third state 00 represent the condition when the hurricane 
conditions have dissipated and the grid is OFF. The final state represents the grid being 
restored after the hurricane conditions have subsided. 
The Markov chain model for the grid behavior using the failure time Tf, wait time 
Tw and repair time Tr distributions for an extreme event  of given intensity can be 
represented by the stochastic system in Fig. 3.2 with the initial conditions that of the grid 
being in state grid on. Failure time is the time taken for a gird outage to occur given the 
grid was working when it came under the influence of a hurricane causing outages and 
under the condition such that under the condition imposed by that hurricane a grid outage 
will occur with probability pf. The probability that a grid outage will occur is calculated 
as follows. 
In chapter 2 [Krishnamurthy and Kwasinski 2013], characterization of power 
systems outage caused by hurricanes was derived for the maximum outage incidence in a 
localized geographical area caused by a hurricane given the four damaging actions: 
maximum wind speed, storm surge, exposure time to at least tropical storm conditions 
and the area affected by tropical storm winds. The grid outage probability given tropical 
cyclone intensity can be calculated using [Krishnamurthy and Kwasinski 2013] 
)(
1
1
bLaf ie
p

      (3.1) 
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 From [Krishnamurthy and Kwasinski 2013] a = 2.6 and b = 5.8 and 
Li=log(LTCIIMOIi)  where 
TVVHAVAVHVLTCII M OI
235915107120111 
  (3.2) 
 V the maximum wind speed, T is the exposure time under at least tropical storm 
conditions, H is the storm surge height and A is the total area of land exposed to at least 
tropical storm winds[Krishnamurthy and Kwasinski 2013]. The plot of L versus the 
outage probability is given in Fig. 3.3. 
In the Markov chain state transition diagram given that an outage will occur for a 
given hurricane intensity, the transition probabilities are governed by the probability mass 
functions of the event times TF, TW and TR. The instantaneous probability of an event 
occurring is calculated as follows in (3.3) 






ij
j
i
i
i
i
f
f
F
f
p
11
    (3.3) 
The pi in (3.3) represents the instantaneous probability in discrete time that the 
event described by f is going to occur given that it has not occurred. This can be termed 
as the discrete hazard rate. If failure and repair time distributions are used, then the 
function pi is the discrete failure rate, discrete repair rate. 
Since the failure, wait and repair times are arbitrary with finite support the 
resulting Markov chain has additional clock state which keeps track of the time spent in 
each state. The resulting state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 3.4.  
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Fig.3.4 . State transition diagram for the evolution of the grid during a tropical cyclone 
the chain occurs with probability pf 
The states of Fig. 3.2 are relabeled as A, B, C, and D in Fig. 3.4 along with a 
number indicating the time spent in each of the states. The probability of the grid being 
on given that an outage will occur with probability pf is )()( tptp DA  . The transient 
solution to grid availability under given intensity given that an outage will occur is 
[Kulkarni 2010] 
gri dgri dgri d Pππ )()1( tt      (3.4) 
With ][)( 10 DAAt  gridπ  and )(tgridπ  is the probability is 
distribution over that state space in Fig. 3.4 at time t and gridP is the one-step transition 
probability matrix which is given by  
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The grid availability function versus time is found with the initial conditions that 
the grid was in a working condition. The initial conditions are given by 
 001)0( gri dπ      (3.6) 
The probabilities in the states of Fig. 3.2 are calculated as )()(
1,,0
ttp
ij
AiA 



  ,
)()(
1,,0
ttp
kj
BjB 
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lj
CjC 
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

  
The total grid availability is therefore  
fDAfgrid ptptpptA  1))()(()(   (3.7) 
The numerical results are given next.  
NUMERICAL STUDIES FOR DATA HURRICANES FROM 2004-2008 
Estimation of the Failure, Wait and Repair time distributions and rates: 
The failure, wait and repair times are obtained using the power system outage 
time series from the hurricane in the years 2004 to 2008. Due to limited data, the LTCII 
range is discretized and the data is grouped into clusters based on their LTCII values. The 
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discretized clusters are labeled as C1 through C6. The values and the corresponding 
outage probabilities are given in Table 3.1. 
The symmetric triangular distribution is used to fit the failure, wait and repair 
time distribution. The equation for the triangular distribution used here is 













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t
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0
)(
)(2
0
2
)(      (3.8) 
Since the distribution is taken to be symmetric the b=2c and c is the mean of the 
distribution.  This triangular distribution is discretized and used in the Markov chain 
model. 
The discretization formula is 
 1...2,1,0,)(
1
 

bidttgf
i
i
i    (3.9)  
 A histogram of the data for each cluster is given in figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. The 
resulting parameters computed from the data for each of the clusters C1 through C6 are 
given in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.  The resulting distributions are plotted in figures 3.8, 
3.9 and 3.10. Using these distributions as input the availability function of the grid is 
calculated for each value of LTCIIMOI. 
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Fig. 3.5 Failure time data for each cluster 
 
Fig. 3.6 Wait time data for each cluster  
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Fig 3.7 Repair time data for each cluster. 
Cluster no. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
L Range 
<4.39 
4.39 to 
5.0234 
5.0234 to 
5.6568 
5.6568 to 
6.2903 
6.2903 to 
6.9237 >6.9237 
pf 
<0.0249 
0.0249 to 
0.1172 
0.1172 to 
0.4080 
0.4080 to 
0.7816 
0.7816 to 
0.9489 >0.9489 
Table 3.1: LTCIIMOI discretized clusters and the corresponding range of outage 
probabilities 
Cluster Mean Failure time Mean Wait time Mean Repair time 
C1 2.6264 0.99342 8.8459 
C2 4.3869 0.90152 26.2252 
C3 5.9605 1.825 71.31 
C4 3.8904 6.3167 130.5399 
C5 1 10 188.1839 
C6 1 15.5 309.365 
Table 3.2 Failure time, wait time and repair time means 
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Fig 3.8. Failure time distributions for the LTCIIMOI outage model 
 
Fig 3.9. Wait time distributions for the LTCIIMOI outage model 
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Fig. 3.10 Repair time distributions for the LTCIIMOI outage model 
 
Fig 3.11 Grid availability versus time for various outage probabilities 
Results for grid availability:  
The availability of the grid at any location depends on the LTCII condition 
experienced by that location and the type of rate model used for the repair and failure 
rates.   In order to find the grid availability based on the LTCII first decide which repair 
and failure function to use i.e. for a given location in question. In practice, if one wants to 
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know the availability of the grid under effect of a hurricane characterized with the inputs 
H, V, T and A (the normalized hurricanes actions storm surge height, maximum sustained 
wind speeds, exposure time and Area swept by the hurricane on land), the corresponding 
LTCII needs to be calculated and the failure and repair rate functions derived above for 
the range the LTCII belongs need to be used.  
The procedure is detailed as follows, 
1) Obtain H, V, T, and A for the location under consideration. 
2) Compute the LTCIIMOI.  
3) Calculate the failure probability pf. 
4) Find the cluster in which the computed LTCIIMOI. 
5) Calculate the failure, wait and repair time distribution parameters for that 
cluster. 
 6) Find the failure and repair rate using the discrete hazard function (3.3). 
7) Construct the transition probability matrix given in (3.5) and find the solution 
to (3.4). 
8) Find the overall grid availability using (3.6). 
From Fig. 3.11 it can be seen that the availability function of the grid for higher 
LTCIIMOI is lower than that for lower values of LTCIIMOI. These availability curves can be 
used as inputs for designing back up generation to improve overall power supply 
availability to the load. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented a Markov chain model for calculating the availability of 
the grid during tropical cyclones. The model uses data from hurricanes from 2004 to 
2008 to obtain the transition probabilities in the model for calculating the grid 
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availability. The hurricane intensity defined by the LTCIIMOI was used to calculate the 
outage probability. It was seen that with a growing LTCIIMOI value the grid availability 
worsens. This availability model can be used to design the backup system to improve the 
overall power supply availability at the load. 
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Chapter 4: Microgrid Distributed Energy Resources: Energy Sources, 
Storages and Renewables 
This chapter discusses two main topics: a) the distributed energy resources of a 
microgrid and b) renewables energy sources and storage and their availability modeling 
with focus on PV systems. 
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES IN A MICROGRID 
Energy Sources 
Renewables: 
Renewable energy sources include photovoltaics, wind power plants, hydro 
power, bio fuels and geothermal power, photovoltaics and wind are two of the most 
popularly used [Song et al. 2013] and are also considered as prime candidates for their 
low green house emissions [Varaiya et al. 2011][Hatziargyriou and Zervos 2001]. 
Renewable energy sources are being considered for many microgrid application such as 
military bases [Sandia 2013] and telecommunication bases stations [NTT  Docomo 
2012][NTT 2013a]. Renewable energy sources, however, have intermittent power supply 
due to inherent variability present in the natural phenomena that govern their energy 
output [Kwasinski et al. 2012]. In the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake of 2011, 
Japanese telecom provider has started building green bases starting and resilient base 
stations [NTT 2013]. 
Micro-turbines, Diesel gensets and Portable generators 
Micro-turbines, diesel gensets and portable generators are widely used distributed 
generation solutions especially as backup power supply. Micro-turbines can run on 
various types of fuels for example natural gas, biogas and propane [Capstone]. The 
efficacy and reliable use in improving power supply availability during natural disasters 
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is dependent on the type of natural disaster and the operating conditions imposed in the 
aftermath of the disaster. This is primarily because of the dependency on external 
infrastructure called lifelines. Lifeline interdependence is a wide area of research and it is 
critical in understanding the behavior of microgrid in normal operating conditions and in 
extreme events like natural disasters. During natural disasters, the dependency on 
lifelines increases due to the reduced power supply availability form the main grid. The 
lifelines impacted during natural disasters can be different depending on type of the 
disasters. For example in hurricanes like Gustav, extensive outages were prevented by 
using fixed natural gas generators which did not need refueling due to the presence of gas 
pipes which are largely unaffected during hurricanes [Kwasinski 2011b], however during 
earthquakes natural gas supply can be affected due to damage to gas pipelines [Kwasinski 
2011b]. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 DLC with small genset Hurricane Ike. 
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Fig. 4.2 DLC with temporary diesel genset installed after Hurricane Ike. 
 As mentioned before back-up power is extremely important during natural disasters. 
During the 2011 Japan earthquake, in the Tohoku region, there were 220 base stations out 
of service on March 11, the first day of the earthquake, with a rapid increase to 6270 in 
one day due to power supply issues, that is due to drained batteries resulting from 
extended power outages [NTT Docomo 2012]  
 
Fig 4.3 A portable genset powering a base station near the town of Saichi [TCLEE 2012]. 
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Portable generators are a useful solution for of deploying power for sites that have lost 
power during natural disasters. For example, NTT DoCoMo deployed 30 truck carried 
generators and about 400 portable gensets [TCLEE 2012] in the aftermath of the 
Japanese 2011 earthquake. For example, Fig. 4.3 shows a portable genset used to power a 
base station near the town of Saichi [TCLEE 2012]. 
Fuel cells 
Fuel cells are another option that can be considered while choosing sources for 
microgrid applications. They have also been suggested as support or even replacements 
diesel gensets as backup power sources [Spink and Saathoff 2013,Gagge 2008]. 
Examples of fuel cells used during Hurricane Isaac in New Orleans and in Garden City in 
New York during Irene and Sandy shown in Figs. 4.4 and 4.5. With the diminishing use 
of nuclear power in Japan post the Japan earthquake of 2011, fuel cells are becoming a 
contender for possible power supply solutions[Fuel Cell today 2013]. 
 
Fig. 4.4 Fuel Cell deployed for DLC after Hurricane Isaac. 
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Fig. 4.5 Verizon CO fuel cell Irene Sandy 
Storage 
Energy storage maybe classified into the following types based on the mechanism 
of storage. However a particular type of technology might fit in more than one category. 
1) Electrical storage which include batteries and ultra-capacitors 
2) Mechanical energy storage which flywheels, compressed air. 
3)  Chemical energy storage which include natural gas, batteries, diesel, 
gasoline, fuel cells. Chemical energy storage mechanisms like fuel and 
batteries are some of the most common for DGs like diesel gensets, natural 
gas turbines and RESs like solar and wind. 
Various storage devices can be compared using the Ragone plot [Ragone] given 
in Fig. 4.6. 
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Fig 4.6 Ragone plot of various storage devices [Song et al. 2013.] 
Operational and practical considerations for electrical energy storage  
Storage is expected to decouple the microgrid from the dependence on external 
power.  The availability of power to the microgrid itself serves as a measure of this 
dependency Storage is said to effectively decouple the external dependency of a 
microgrid on its lifeline if the availability of power supply to a microgrid from the DER 
is high even for a lifeline with low availability. In the following chapter that discusses the 
modeling of fuel supply to diesel genset; it will be shown that even for small 
availabilities of the lifeline the presence of any storage can improve the availability 
multifold. This improvement in availability is same in the case of DER without lifeline 
but with variable input like renewables. The availability improvement brought about by 
the storage is however dependent on the operation of the microgrid or the DER itself. In 
the case of diesel genset the fuel delivery could be dependent on the amount of fuel 
present in the tank or fuel orders could occur independent of the fuel state. Efficiencies of 
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the DER and the charging and discharging efficiencies of electrical storage affect the 
energy available to the load in the microgrid. Therefore during the design stage and 
during the operation of the storage, these practical aspects need to be considered while 
evaluating the availability, 
AVAILABILITY OF RENEWABLES ENERGY SOURCES WITH STORAGE 
Definition Renewable Energy Power Supply (REPS) system is the renewable 
energy source such as a PV or a wind turbine and generator along with its associated 
storage. 
Availability of REPS system 
Definition Availability A(t) at time t is defined as the probability that at time t, the 
load demand is met by the REPS. Unavailability is the probability that the load demand is 
not met i.e. U(t)=1-A(t).In the absence of storage, the equation for availability of a  
REPS system with a collection of renewable energy sources and loads without energy 
storage is 
                          (4.1) 
If the sum of the total energy produced by the sources is less than the load energy 
demand then some storage is required to support the loads for those times.  Let B(t) be 
the energy content of a storage device supporting the load. The availability equation for 
the REPS system including the energy storage is 
                                (4.2) 
Let               and          be the probability mass function of the source, 
battery SOC and the load demand at time t. Assuming that the load is independent of the 
fuel arrivals the availability is given by  
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The assumption that the load and the PV input (insolation) can sometimes be 
invalid, which would mean that the convolution formula in (4.3) cannot be used. 
However this issue can be easily overcome by first obtaining the distributions     and 
finding    by simulation.  For the remainder of this dissertation the PV input is assumed 
to be independent of the load.  
RENEWABLE ENERGY SYSTEM OR RENEWABLE ENERGY POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, 
AVAILABILITY MODELING 
The equations for the energy transfer dynamics are as follows. Let X be the power 
output from the PV panel. Let L be the load. Then the energy transferred to and from the 
battery is given by  
 )()()( tLtXt       (4.4) 
When 0 , energy is transferred to the battery i.e. the battery charges and 
when, 0  energy is transferred out of the battery i.e. the battery discharges. 
The battery state of charge evolves as follows 
CtB
ttBtB


)(0
)()()1(
     (4.5) 
 Efficiency and Degradation of Electrical storage: impact on availability modeling 
and sizing of storage 
Charge and discharge efficiency 
Charge and discharge efficiency plays an important role in the storage sizing. For 
non unity efficiencies the amount of energy lost per storage cycle can be high. For 
example suppose the 10 J and the charging efficiency is 1i  say 0.9 then the 
energy transferred to the battery is 90109.0  i  and now let the energy demand 
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be 10 J and the discharge efficiency be 1o  say 0.9, then the amount of energy 
drained out of the battery is 111.11109.0/1)/1(  o  J 
CtB
ttBtB

 
)(0
)()()1( 
    (4.6) 
 is the charge/discharge efficiency, if the charging efficiency is i  and 
discharge efficiency is o  then for 0  , i   and for 0 , o /1  
 Capacity degradation 
Over the life of the battery the amount energy that can be stored in the battery 
decreases. There are a number of reasons which include corrosion and temperature. 
An example of the geographical variation with battery life performance due to 
environmental conditions is given in Fig. 4.7 Song et al. 2013. 
 
Fig. 4.7 Geographical impact on battery life due to temperature variation and humidity 
and atmospheric conditions and availability [Song et al. 2013] 
In the Markov chain model for storage is given. First the degradation is ignored 
and the efficiency is set to unity. 
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Markov chain energy storage model for calculating availability 
From (4.5) it can be seen that the future of the battery state of charge depends on 
the present value of the battery SOC which means that the changes in the battery SOC are 
Markovian in nature. The battery SOC change is completely governed by the value of  . 
Given the statistics of   the probability mass function for the battery SOC can be 
known. The statistics of   is given by the statistics of the PV and the load which is 
given next. 
PV  Statistics  
 Insolation for the PV panels is collected for 7 months in Austin, TX. The input 
power to the PV panel is given in Fig. 4.8. The corresponding histogram is given in Fig. 
4.9.  The panel is assumed to have an efficiency of 15%. With a total installed capacity 
of 10 kW. The mean PV input per unit area is 260 W/m
2
. The area of the panel is 
adjusted such that the mean power output given the efficiency and capacity is 1.05 kW. 
The parameters for the installed PV array are given in table 4.1. The resulting PV output 
is given in Fig. 4.10. 
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Fig. 4.8 PV Incident power collected from 7:00am to 7:00pm for 7 months. [Song et al. 
2013] 
 
Fig. 4.9 Histogram of incident PV power [Song et al. 2013] 
 
Fig. 4.10 Output of the PV panel with the insolation with parameters of Table 4.1 
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PV input exponential parameter 0.0038 W
-1
 
Total installed PV capacity 10 kW 
Mean PV input per unit area 260 W/m
2
 
Panel conversion efficiency 15% 
Area of array installed 26.67 m
2
 
Mean output of array 1.05 kW 
Peak output of array 10 kW 
Table 4.1 Photovoltaics and interface battery parameters 
Load Behavior 
Load statistics play an important role in determining the battery SOC. The load 
behavior can be complicated and load exhibit periodic behavior such as seasonality and 
day and night variation, i.e. the load can have very different distributions during different 
regimes like day time and night time and during different seasons like summer and 
winter.  A plot of load observed from September 2011 to August 2012 is shown in Fig. 
4.11. In this work the load considered here is assumed to be stationary in order to 
simplify the models. 
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Fig. 4.11 Load versus time for September 2011 to August 2012.[NHEC 2012] 
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Fig. 4.12 Load variation over a week for the first week of September 2011. 
The load versus time for the first week of September 2011 is shown in Fig. 4.12. 
The plots suggest that there exists some periodicity in the load statistics. Street lighting 
from Fig. 4.12 exhibits a very strict periodicity almost deterministic and takes two values. 
Therefore such loads could be considered deterministic but time varying. The load 
statistics for each of the load types is given in Fig. 4.13. 
In the work described here, for simplicity, the Markov chains model presented 
assume that the load is stationary. If the load were assumed to be non stationary then each 
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of the terms corresponding to the load terms in the transition probability matrix for the 
evolution of the battery state of charge would also be time varying. 
 
Fig. 4.13 Load Statistics observed from September 2011 through August 2012. 
The loads used to exemplify the REPS availability model are assumed to be 
binomial with parameters given in the table 4.2. The plot for the distributions is shown in 
Fig. 4.14. 
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Fig. 4.14 Load probability mass function 
Storage Behavior 
Let the battery capacity be C in energy units. Divide the tank C into N+1 states 
from 0 to N.  The state transition diagram for the Markov chain describing the transitions 
in the battery state of charge is given in Fig. 4.15. 
 
Fig. 4.15 State transition diagram for the battery state of charge 
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In practical purposes is usually the case that N >M which means that battery 
cannot be discharged from full capacity to empty in 1 time step. The transition 
probability matrix is   
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As discussed before, the unavailability of the REPS system is given by the 
probability of the fitness function being negative i.e. the total energy difference between 
the REPS and Load for a given time step is   
 


0
)()0(
g
GR E P S gfGPU     (4.12) 
 where, BG fff   , also note that LX fff    which is the distribution of 
the difference in the energy between source and load. 
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Optimal Energy Storage Size 
Availability vs. energy storage capacity  
The cost of storage can be high for highly available power supply as large 
amounts of storage might be needed. Additionally, over sizing the storage might be 
prohibitively expensive. Therefore storage size needs to be minimized in order to make 
capital costs low without sacrificing availability because a lower availability means larger 
downtime cost. It can be assumed that the cost of storage is non decreasing in capacity. 
Therefore smaller the storage in MWh, the lower will be the cost therefore while sizing 
the storage size, minimize the total storage cost for a given availability constraint i.e. find 
the smallest value of capacity C that will yield  
specREPS UU       (4.13) 
  where 
REPSU  is found using (4.12) 
Results 
A plot of availability versus capacity is given for the various values of load in Fig. 
4.16. If the availability requirement is 0.9 for a maximum load of size 13 then the 
minimum amount of storage required for satisfying the constraint is 20 kWh. When the 
REPs is used in a microgrid with diverse sources like diesel gensets, the overall 
availability can be further improved which is demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
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Fig. 4.16 Availability vs. Capacity for a PV system for various loads. 
  
Load (kW) 1 2 3 4 5 
P 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
N 7 13 17 23 29 
mean 3.5 6.5 8.5 11.5 14.5 
Max  7 13 17 23 29 
variance 1.75 3.25 4.25 5.75 7.25 
Table 4.2 Load parameters for the PV REPS 
SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed two main topics: the distributed energy resources of a 
microgrid and the availability modeling of a renewable energy power supply system with 
storage. The availability modeling for the renewable energy power supply systems with 
storage was discussed and the sizing of the storage was discussed.  
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Chapter 5: Microgrid Distributed Energy Resources: Diesel Gensets, 
Fuel Storage and Fuel Delivery Availability 
Microgrid availability depends on the availability characteristics of its individual 
components which mainly fall into two categories, distributed generators and energy 
storage and their dependent infrastructure. However, since distributed generators such as 
diesel gensets depend on lifelines such as transportation networks, whose behavior during 
disasters affects the genset fuel delivery systems, the genset availability is dependent on 
the availability of the transportation network. Energy storage may be used to reduce the 
lifeline dependencies as demonstrated in [Kwasinski 2011a] and another option is to rely 
on renewable energy sources, such as photovoltaic modules or wind turbines that do not 
depend on a lifeline. Fuel cells have also been suggested as an addition in order to 
improve diversity [Spink and Saathoff 2013, Gagge 2008]. 
 Diesel gensets, however, have been widely used for backups for 
telecommunication base stations [Kwasinski et al. 2012, TCLEE 2012]. They are also 
deployed as portable generators to power cell sites during hurricane and earthquakes 
[TCLEE 2012,Dueñas-Osorio and Kwasinski 2010] and are popular choice for local 
generation in microgrids [Krishnamurthy et al. 2008]. Diesel gensets are also the primary 
choice for power supply in remote areas [Tammam et al. 2012]. There are, however, 
many reliability issues with the use of diesel gensets even with the presence of the 
storage because the storage primarily depends on the lifeline to supply it with fuel. In 
standalone systems, where the diesel genset is the primary power system, the lifeline 
dependency is more pronounced. Energy storage sizing has been previously studied for 
such stand alone systems [Kwasinski 2011a, Zhao et al. 2013] and well as diesel systems 
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with renewables like wind [Gavaniduo et al. 1993, Yong-Hua 2009, Billinton and Karki 
2001, Ying-Yi and Ruo-Chen 2012]. However, few works study the effect of 
transportation delays and storage and their effects on power supply availability 
[Kwasinski et al. 2012, Kwasinski 2011a].  
 The availability modeling of diesel gensets with storage and discontinuous fuel 
supply i.e. with delays in fuel delivery falls in the class of inventory management 
problems. This chapter presents models to calculate the power supply availability from 
gensets with discontinuous fuel supply and storage that can be used for gensets in various 
applications such as backup or in standby operation, in standalone mode, or as part of a 
microgrid which is the primary intention of the paper. It can also be used for these 
applications during extreme events like natural disasters or while supporting renewables 
like photovoltaic system and wind turbines.  During natural disasters, the microgrids are 
in island mode and the power supply availability is predominately influenced by micro-
grids DERs performance [Yokoyama et al. 2008, Tanrioven 2005, Li et al. 2010]. 
 The availability of the genset is defined as the probability of the genset being 
able to meet the load demand. The gensets’ ability to meet the load demand is in turn 
dependent on the amount of fuel available to the genset. In the absence of a continuous 
flow of fuel, the genset is dependent on its local storage such as a fuel tank for fuel. 
Therefore the availability of the genset can now be described in terms of the amount of 
fuel in fuel tank. The fuel in the tank is replenished by an external system of refueling 
that experiences lead times or delays. In order to find the probability of having a certain 
amount of fuel, Markov chains are used in order to describe the fuel consumption and 
refueling processes. Markov chain models have also been used for the modeling of other 
storage systems such as the modeling of the battery state of charge for renewables in 
Song et al. 2013. Markov and semi-Markov models are widely used in the modeling of 
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queuing systems and inventory management and control [Kashtanov 2010, Girtler 2013], 
which is similar to the approach presented in this chapter [Kwasinski et al. 2012, Song et 
al. 2013, Girtler 2013]. Delays and various logistical problems in transportation systems 
are also widely modeled using semi-Markov processes [Migawa 2013]. 
 An important aspect regarding the fuel consumption is that the load that diesel 
gensets face could be also be stochastic which could be the result of optimization 
schemes applied to the load to consume minimal energy [Lalitha et al. 2013].  Therefore 
finding the amount of time the tank can supply the load is also studied in this chapter. 
 As mentioned before, the fuel arrivals are affected by lead times or delays which 
are stochastic in nature. The incorporation of these lead times in the power supply 
availability model is one of the primary contributions of this chapter. 
The Markov chain models presented in this chapter can be used to analyze the 
availability characteristics of the diesel genset with storage and with discontinuous fuel 
supply in any off the above applications mentioned—standalone, standby or in a 
microgrid. A brief description of the application of the model in each case is given in the 
discussion section. Following are a few basic assumptions that are made while 
developing the models for the genset fuel supply availability. 
A1. All events occur in discrete time. 
A2. All physical quantities (fuel level in the tank, energy demand of the load) are 
discrete or discretized when using the models. 
A3. When the refueling truck arrives the refueling is instantaneous and fills the 
tank completely and the truck leaves. 
A4. Load is finite in size. 
A5. Storage is finite in size. 
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A6. If the fuel truck delivery time is non-geometric then its distribution has finite 
support. 
There are four models discussed here, model 1 is for fuel state independent fuel 
truck arrivals with deterministic constant load. Model 2 is for fuel state dependent fuel 
truck arrivals with deterministic constant load. Model 3 is for fuel state independent fuel 
truck arrivals with stochastic load. Model 4 is for fuel state dependent fuel truck arrivals 
with stochastic load.  
LOAD AND FUEL STORAGE REPRESENTATION: 
Let the fuel tank capacity be C in units of volume (say liters). Let σ be the 
smallest non zero unit of load or the fuel consumed over one time step, then the state 
space for the fuel in the tank is S={0,1,2…N} with each state i representing the presence 
of iσ units of fuel being present in the tank. The tank capacity is C=σN. Let π(t) denote 
the probability mass function (pmf) over the state space S i.e. the fuel level at time t and 
correspondingly π(0) is the initial state of the fuel tank and the long term, steady 
probability is π. 
MARKOV CHAIN MODELS FOR FUEL STORAGE AND FUEL DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH 
DETERMINISTIC LOADS 
Here the Markov chain tank models for state dependent and state independent fuel 
truck arrivals are described. Assumptions A1 to A6 hold with the additional assumption 
that the load is deterministic and constant. The load is normalized to be of size 1 since it 
consumes a constant value each time step. 
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Model 1: Deterministic constant load with fuel state independent fuel arrivals: 
Formulation: 
This the most basic model for the tank that is considered in this chapter. The fuel 
supply system is shown in Fig. 5.1a. The state space of the fuel tank has N states. Let b(t) 
be the probability that a refueling event occurs at time t. This b(t)  is derived from the 
fuel tank arrival process indicated as point A (which is modeled separately as a two state 
process where the fuel delivery system is present or not present at the genset site at time t 
in the following section). This b(t)  represents the scheduling of the truck arrival. Now 
consider the changes in the fuel tank fuel level.  
 
Fig. 5.1a Diesel genset and fuel supply system powered by trucks  
 
Fig. 5.1b Fuel tank state transition diagram for model 1 
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This is process is indicated by the flow of fuel indicated as B in Fig 5.1a. The 
change in the fuel tank occurs because of two events: refueling to full tank capacity or the 
consumption of the fuel by genset, which is one unit of fuel per unit time. This implies 
that there are only two transitions out of each state 1) a refueling event or 2) 1 unit fuel is 
consumed. Since the randomness of the refueling event is the only stochastic element 
(other than the restoration of grid when the model is applied to standby mode) in the 
genset operation, the b(t) alone is sufficient to characterize the transition in the fuel level 
at time t. The transition diagram at time instant t is given in Fig. 1b. Let P(t) be the 
transition probability matrix (TPM) that describes the change in the probability 
distribution )(tπ  on the fuel tank level at time t to then, 
     
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
 
     
     
   
  
  
 
     
           
 
 
 
 
  (5.1) 
The distribution over the fuel tank state space is found by [Kulkarni 2010] 
π(t)=π(t-1)P(t)     (5.2) 
which yields the transient solution which needs to be found to find the probability 
of being in any tank state for each time instant. In order to numerically find the time 
varying )(tπ  .for ],...,2,1[ Mt   with π(t)=π(t-1)P(t)and given )0(π .M is decided by the 
length of the operational interval of the genset over which the genset availability is to be 
found. When the refueling events are homogenous in time the probability that the system 
is refueling is independent of time i.e. b(t) =b, a constant which makes P(t)=P. If M is 
large enough then the equation π=πP (and the condition that the components of π add to 
1) can be used to find the distribution π, which yields π =[(1-b)N-1 b(1-b)N-2  b(1-b)N-
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3…
b(1-b)
N-1 
b]. The unavailability U of the genset system is the probability of the fuel 
tank being empty 0 . 
1
0 )1(
 NbU       (5.3) 
Next a Markov chain model for calculating b(t), the fuel delivery availability, is 
considered. 
Fuel delivery model for calculating the value of b(t): 
The fuel delivery into the genset via the fuel storage (GFS) system can be 
represented by two distinct states, the presence of a fuel flow to the GFS system and the 
absence of the fuel flow, indicated as point A in Fig 5.1a. In this chapter, the 
discontinuous flow of fuel is considered wherein a fuel has to be delivered via trucks to 
the genset site. The fuel delivery system is said to be available when there exists a fuel 
truck at the site as shown in Fig 5.1a. From the assumptions A1 and A3, the 
instantaneous refueling allows the truck to be at the site for 1 time step unless the fuel 
delivery time distribution is such that two consecutive arrivals of the fuel truck can occur.  
The model considered here is such that two consecutive arrivals do not occur, which is 
the case in extreme events. However the model can be modified to incorporate the 
consecutive arrivals as well. The two state representation of the fuel truck delivery 
process is given in Fig. 2a. The states SNRF and SRF represent the absence and the presence 
of the fuel truck at the site respectively. The instantaneous (one step) arrival probability 
of the fuel truck is, however, time dependent (unless the arrival time of the fuel truck is 
geometrically distributed). Therefore the amount of time spent in the SNRF state needs to 
be accounted for, which is done by creating the states 01 to 0m. From A6, m is finite as the 
arrival time has a maximum value.  
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Fig 5.2a: Two state process representing the presence or absence of a fuel truck at the site 
for refueling 
 
Fig 5.2b: State transition diagram for the fuel truck delivery clock states 
The process now can be represented using the Markov chain given in Fig. 5.2b 
whose transition probabilities are derived using the instantaneous arrival probability 
equation (5.4) [Marshall and Olkin 2007] and the corresponding TPM is given in (5.5). 
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In case the refueling time is given as a continuous random variable, it can be 
discretized. The discretization of the fuel delivery function can be illustrated using an 
example for fd. A triangular probability function and its discretized version are shown in 
Fig. 5.3. [Kwasinski et al. 2012]  
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Fig 5.3 Discretization of the continuous time triangular probability density  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
   
 
    
    
    
   
   
   
   
 
            
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (5.5)  
And ),()( tNtb Ψπ the nth component of Ψπ , the distribution over the states in 
Fig. 5.2b calculated from 
ΨΨΨ Pππ )()1( tt  with initial conditions 1)0,( NΨπ . The 
steady state solution for Ψπ  is obtained as follows 
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Where   is 
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On rearranging  
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The above result in (5.8) can be derived in another way by considering the 2-state 
system to be a semi-Markov process. The long run distribution in state SRF would be 
given by [Kulkarni 2010]  
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 However the method of (5.5) is useful in deriving the TPM for fuel state 
dependent truck arrivals. The representation of the fuel delivery system described here is 
also representative of a continuous fuel delivery system with failures and repairs that can 
occur homogenously in time.  
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 The Markov chain can also be thought of as representing the transitions of a 
stop-clock keeping track of the fuel arrivals resetting on each fuel arrival, that is to say 
there is a one to one correspondence from the state of the Markov chain of Fig. 2b to that 
of a clock monitoring the arrival of the fuel truck. In the models that follow the clock 
states hence refer to the states of fuel delivery system as described by the state space of 
Fig. 5.2b.  
Model 2: Deterministic constant load with fuel state dependent fuel order 
placements: 
Formulation: 
In this model, first the state space is constructed then the conditional probabilities 
for the transitions of the fuel level are derived depending on when the fuel orders are 
placed. Let the fuel tank start at time zero from the state of being full. It consumes one 
unit of fuel per time step and let the number of states be N+1. When the fuel level 
reaches state ξ≤N, a fuel order is placed. The refueling truck arrives according to a fuel 
delivery time distribution fd. In case the fuel delivery time distribution is continuous, a 
discretized version of that distribution is used. Let pd be the discretized version of fd. pd 
gives the refueling probability at each time instants. Once the order is placed, the change 
is the fuel level in that 1 time-step is affected by the probability of arrival of the fuel truck 
in that time step. ξ is when the fuel delivery order is placed and that corresponds to t=0 
for the fuel delivery time probability function. The fuel consumption occurs until the tank 
hits the state zero or refueling occurs. Until the point of hitting zero, the empty state, the 
state of the fuel tank itself accounts for the time (because the fuel tank level cannot be in 
that same state for more than one time-step because the generator is consuming fuel 
constantly) for which there was no fuel delivery but when the tank hits empty, the time 
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spent in zero for each time step needs to be tracked when there is no fuel delivery 
because the probability of fuel delivery is dependent on time. In order to keep track of the 
time states, zero is rewritten with some temporary states that account for the time spent in 
empty state. These states are labeled as }0,,0,0{ 11  mm  which indicate the state of 
the tank at empty for those time intervals. The state transition diagram for the Markov 
chain model is given in Fig. 5.4. The transition probabilities between states can be written 
using the above derivation in matrix form. The transition probability matrix has rows 
corresponding to the states in the following order
},1,,1,,1,,3,2,1,0,,0,0{ 11 NNS mm     .  
 
Fig. 5.4 State transition diagram for model 2 
In order to make the constructing of the matrix easier, consider the following 
partition of the state space in two regimes },...,3,2,1,0,,0,0{ 11  mm and 
},,1{ NZ   . 
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Where each 
ji
Γ  are block matrices containing the transition probabilities from 
states in regime i to states in j. 
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Where the entries ,..3,2,1, ipi  and mip i ,..3,2,1,0   are calculated using 
formulae  
                       (5.15) 
                     (5.16)  
Note that the total number of states including the temporary states N+ m. 
The probability of being in the state space S is found as follows. 
                    (5.17) 
The probability of being in empty state is given by 
  
          
                 (5.18)  
The i in the superscript indicates the ith state. On solving  
             (5.19) 
The steady state solution is obtained with the empty tank probability 
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            (5.20)  
The fuel delivery availability can still be quantified using (5.8) and the power 
supply availability can be calculated for the given the fuel storage size. 
 
Fig 5.5 transition diagram for fuel tank Markov chain model 3 
MARKOV CHAIN MODELS FOR FUEL STORAGE AND FUEL DELIVERY SYSTEMS WITH 
STOCHASTIC LOADS 
In this section the models developed for deterministic loads are extended to 
include stochastic loads. All assumptions A1 to A6 hold with the additional assumption 
that the stochastic load is stationary.  
Model 3: State independent fuel arrivals with stochastic loads:  
In model 1, the load was characterized as constant while consuming 1 unit of fuel. 
The downward transitions hence in the markov chain occur only in adjacent states. In 
order to account for any varying of load the model can be extended as follows to 
incorporate stochastic loads. As mentioned before the load is assumed to be stationary 
with state space L={0,1,2,…K}with pmf fL={a0,a1,a2,…aK}. The state transition diagram 
is given in Fig.5.5. The TPM is given by 
 82 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
   
 
    
   
 
     
 
 
 
 
   
  
     
     
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (5.21) 
and 
               (5.22)  
is the probability that i units of fuel are consumed given that there is no refueling 
event. The transient and steady state solution as before are calculated using  
                
       
   (5.23) 
The inputs to the model are ai=P(L=i) which is obtained from load data which for 
example could be a microgrid load and the refueling probability b=P(F=SRF) also called 
the fuel delivery system availability can obtained from analysis of the fuel delivery 
system. And the fuel level pmf is fF=πF then, the availability is calculated as follows 
assuming that the load is independent of the fuel arrivals  
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The refueling truck availability represented by b=P(F=SRF)  is long term fraction 
of time the fuel truck spends in the refueling state.  
Model 4: Model for state dependent fuel ordering scheme with stochastic loads: 
In this model, the fuel truck is called based on the level of fuel present in the tank 
similar to that of the model 2 except that the load is now stochastic. The general 
assumptions A1 to A6 still hold. In model 2 the load consumed/demand exactly one unit 
of fuel per time step which means that the time elapsed from the instant the fuel order 
was placed and the current time is directly encoded in the state, that is given the fuel state 
the amount of time from when the fuel order was placed is directly calculable. The only 
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condition under which the additional clock states were needed in model 1 was in when 
the tank was in the empty state. A key difference and complication introduced by the 
stochasticity of the load is that the time elapsed after placing the fuel order is not known 
from the state of the fuel tank alone. In order to keep track of the time elapsed, the clock 
state is also recorded. Therefore the state space for fuel level less than and equal to ξ is 
two dimensional. Each state is thereby represented by a pair (x,y) where x represents the 
clock state and y represents the fuel state. The resulting state transition diagram is given 
in Fig. 5.6.  
 
Fig 5.6. State transition diagram for fuel tank Markov chain model 4 
The transitions in this model can be rather complicated however the transition 
probability matrix can be easily derived by making use of the some of the machinery 
already developed in fuel state independent model 3. In order to do so, first construct the 
state space for the 2D process over which the Markov chain is to be described. Let 
X={0,1,2,..m} be  set of states the fuel delivery clock takes and let Y={0,1,2,…., ξ -1, ξ , 
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ξ +1,…N-1,N} be the set of states the fuel in tank can be in. as before in model 3 define 
},...,3,2,1,0{  and },,1{ NZ   .The state space for the 2D Markov chain is
},{ ZX  . Let PΩ be the transition matrix for Markov chain describing the 
evolution over Ω and the corresponding rows are given by the tuple (x, y) for x=1,…m 
and y < ξ. The downward transitions in Z partition of Ω are exactly the same as in model 
3. PΩ is decomposed into 4 blocks, ΩΞΞ is the block containing the transition within the 
states that correspond to the fuel tank have a fuel level less than or equal to ξ 
    
      
      
     (5.25) 
Note: ξ and the maximum value of load K govern the accessibility of the states in 
the 2D tank-truck state space transitions reached in 1 step with probability >0. Therefore 
these states appear only if the initial conditions give them a p>0. Consider first the 
transition probability matrix for the fuel tank given in model 3. Let ΓΞΞ be the downward 
transition block of the PΓ, the fuel tank transition matrix. Decompose PΓ into the 
following blocks; ΓΞΞ contains the transition probabilities among the states  in model 3 
and ΓZZ contains the transition probabilities among the states; ΓΞZ contains the transition 
from Ξ to Z and ΓZΞ contains the transition from Z to. Ξ. Let PΨ be transition matrix for 
the fuel delivery system and let Ψ00 be the downward transitions block of PΨ. Let 
ΓΞΞD=ΓΞΞ(1-b) with b=0 which yields the transitions (downward) within the tank state 
space in the absence of refueling. The transitions in the sub-ξ states (the state 
corresponding to the states which have a fuel level less than or equal to ξ ) along with the 
fuel truck delivery clock states  are now given by the Kroneckar product of the ΓΞΞD and 
the Ψ00 i.e. The transitions between the states in X   is given by 
00ΨΓΩ   D     (5.26) 
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The transitions out of the sub-ξ tank and truck clock states when a refueling 
events occurs and the refueling fill the tanks by assumption A6. Therefore the transitions 
in the matrix ΩΞZ are all zeros except in the rightmost column of the matrix which is 
calculated by 1 minus the sum over the columns of ΩΞΞ. The formulae for the blocks of 
PΩ are summarized as follows 
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The Markov chain on Ω hence described has some transient states i.e. states 
below ξ that cannot be reached in 1 step with probability >0 from states above ξ. 
Therefore these states appear in the realization if and only if the initial conditions are 
such that the chain starts from one of those states. The limiting probability distribution 
over Ω is given by 
           (5.28) 
In order to find the distribution over the state space of the fuel i.e. the marginal for 
the tank. 
  
      
     (5.29) 
Where    
      
  
   is called the lumping matrix. 
The unavailability is again found by  
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Example: The above construction is exemplified using the following genset 
system which contains 5 tank states, 3 states for the fuel delivery clock and 4 states for 
the load whose state transition diagram is given in Fig.5.7. Using the same notation as 
above for the 2D tank truck system the parameters are a=[1/10,3/10,5/10,1/10] and 
 86 
p=[0,2/10,5/8,1] with distribution on the tank states as 
π=[0.2471,0.1376,0.2016,0.1034,0.3102]  
 
Fig 5.7 State transition diagram for the example of model 4 
Load (kw) L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 
P 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
N 7 13 17 23 29 
Mean 3.5 6.5 8.5 11.5 14.5 
Max  7 13 17 23 29 
Variance 1.75 3.25 4.25 5.75 7.25 
Table 5.1: Load Parameters 
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Table 5.2: Fuel Delivery pmf Parameters Long 
Load (kW) 1 2 3 4 5 
Ti 8 11 13 15 17 
Td 11 15 17 20 24 
Tm 15 18 23 26 30 
B 0.077 0.0621 0.051 0.045 0.0399 
Table 5.3: Fuel Delivery pmf Parameters Short  
 RESULTS, APPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The diesel genset availability calculations for various values of load, fuel arrival 
pmfs and fuel tank capacity were calculated for models 1 through 4. Models 1 and 2 
which consider deterministic constant loads are special cases of models 3 and 4 which 
consider the general case of stationary stochastic loads, therefore the results for the 
models 3 and 4 only are shown here. The load data used is given in table 5.1 and the fuel 
arrival pmf parameters are given in tables 5.2 and 5.3. The load pmfs used are binomial 
distributions for illustrative purposes shown in Fig. 5.8. The triangular densities are used 
for the fuel arrivals and these are discretized and used in the models for calculating the 
availability. Two sets of fuel arrivals pmfs are used. The first set represents long delays in 
Load (kW) 1 2 3 4 5 
Ti 10 19 28 45 43 
Td 20 29 38 50 53 
Tm 30 45 60 65 85 
B 0.0465 0.0292 0.0203 0.0162 0.0127 
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the fuel arrival whereas the second represents relatively shorter delays in the arrival of the 
fuel truck. The long delay densities are shown Fig. 5.9 and the short delay densities are 
shown in Fig. 5.10.  
In order to use the models for practical calculations, the physical quantities such 
as fuel units and load values needs to be converted to the form as required by the models. 
For example, the energy content in diesel is 36 MJ/Litre [DOE], and the efficiency of 
diesel gensets are assumed to be around 40%. Let the smallest positive unit of load be 1 
kW. Then for a time step of 1 hour, the number of units of fuel consumed in number of 
joules in 1 hour is 36 MJ. But since the efficiency is 40% and the volume of fuel 
consumed is 1/0.4 or the energy demand is 2.5x36MJ. Therefore the amount of fuel 
required to supply unit load for 1 time step is 2.5 liters or 1 unit of fuel tank corresponds 
to 2.5 liters of fuel. Using this method, the load is converted to the same units as the fuel 
consumed.  
 
Fig. 5.8  Load Probability mass functions 
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Fig. 5.9 Long Delays: Truck arrival density evaluated at 1 hour steps 
  
Fig. 5.10 Short delays: Truck arrival density evaluated at 1 hour steps 
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Availability versus Storage Capacity 
Figures 5.11 to 5.14 show the plots of availability for models 3 and model 4 for 
long and short delays. Given a delay distribution for the truck it can be seen that the 
availability grows with increasing capacity of the tank. Model 3 which considers the fuel 
delivery availability directly as a refueling probability shows that even for low values of 
fuel delivery available like 0.0465, when a storage of capacity 50 units is introduced, for 
a mean load of 3.5 kW an availability of 0.5 is achieved, which corresponds to  2 orders 
of magnitude improvement in availability. The growth of availability with increase in 
storage at small values of storage is rapid i.e. when fuel supply availability is low the 
improvement in availability with additional storage improves the availability greatly. 
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show the pmf of the fuel tank for tank capacity =80 units (200 
liters for 1 unit =2.5 liters) for models 3 and 4 for long and short delays. It can be seen 
that peak probability occurs at the tank empty state for relatively longer delays and is 
indicated in both models. For model 4, ξ =0.5 was used in the plots. It must be noted that 
the fuel consumption rate can also depend on the rating of the generator [Diesel Service 
Chart]. 
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Fig. 5.11 Long Delays: Availability vs Capacity for model 3 for load L1.  
 
Fig. 5.12 Short Delays: Availability vs Capacity for model 3 for load L1.  
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Fig. 5.13 Long Delays: Availability vs. Capacity for model 4 for load L1.  
 
Fig. 5.14 Short delays: Availability vs. Capacity for model 4 for load L1. 
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Fig. 5.15 Fuel tank pmf for model 3 for Load L1 for capacity 80 units  
 
Fig. 5.16 Fuel tank pmf for model 4 for Load L1 for capacity 80 units. 
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Availability vs ξ and optimal fuel order placement policy  
The value of ξ controls the time at which the fuel order is placed in model 4. The 
value of ξ indicates the amount of time the controller waits before placing a fuel order. 
Smaller the value of ξ the more the controller waits to place an order. Also smaller the 
value of ξ longer is the time between running of out sufficient fuel and the refueling 
event, which reduces the overall availability of fuel to the genset. However waiting for 
long enough reduces the number of fuel orders placed over a period of time thereby 
reducing the cost incurred. Therefore, if an availability specification is mentioned then 
for a given feasible fuel capacity C, the value of ξ can be minimized in order to minimize 
the incurred cost of buying fuel. The optimization problem is described as follows. 
 
Fig. 5.17  Control vs Availability for capacity 40 and Load L1.  
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Fig. 5.18  Control vs Availability for capacity 50 and Load L1  
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    (5.31) 
A plot of ξ versus A is given in Fig. 5.17 and 5.18 for set of long delays arrivals 
for tank capacities of 40 and 50 units. The value of ξ is chosen at the point when the 
curve intersects the availability specification. The necessary and sufficient conditions that 
the TPM needs to satisfy for the of ξ falls within a broader class of problems 
[Arapostathis et al. 2003] which can form a basis for future work in optimizing the 
scheduling of fuel.   
Nominal Tank Autonomy: 
 The nominal tank autonomy is defined as the amount of time taken for the fuel 
level to go from full to empty before a refueling event occurs. This time in markov chain 
terminology is the hitting time of the state 0 from state full. The markov chain in this 
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description has no upward transitions i.e. no refueling events. The Markov chain makes a 
transition every one step of time therefore the hitting time is the length of the path taken 
from the state F to state 0. The problem of finding the tank nominal autonomy now 
reduces to finding the path length distribution from node F to 0 in the directed graph of 
the state space of the fuel tank. However the self loops caused by the load= 0 makes the 
graph cyclic. In the cyclic graph the hitting time is unbounded, however an 
approximation can be made in order to change the graph into an acyclic graph and get an 
approximate nominal autonomy time distribution. Assume that that the probability of 
load being zero is zero or condition on L > 0, and the problem reduces to setting a0 = 0 
with new probability distribution a for the load, which makes the graph a directed acyclic 
graph. Let Θ be the set of all possible paths from state F to 0. Let Ri be the set of paths 
with path length i, the collection {Ri} forms a partition of Θ. Let Eij be the sequence of 
edges in path j of length i. Let eijk be the kth edge in path j of length i. Let qijk be the 
probability that eijk exists. Note that qijk>0 (edges with probability zero have weight 0 and 
therefore do not appear as edges in the graph and are not considered as part of a path). 
Therefore the product of the probability of the edges in the path gives the probability of 
that path being taken. 
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Fig. 5.19 Fuel tank nominal autonomy for mean load values in Table I  
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Now since the paths taken are mutually exclusive their probabilities can be added, 
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 The set of qi is the hitting time/ path length distribution and i={0 to N-1}. Note 
that since the graph is acyclic and finite. The maximum time to hit the empty state is N-1. 
In the original case where a0>0 the time is not bounded above but the expected value of 
the tank autonomy time is finite because the of the Markov chain property that a finite a 
periodic irreducible markov chain is positive recurrent. This method of path enumeration 
is also however computationally intensive. In some cases the number of paths maybe of 
the order of n!, which makes the calculation intractable for even modest values of n. In 
practice is easier to estimate the tank autonomy using the mean value of the load to get 
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the mean nominal autonomy. For example consider the case of the tank capacity of 100 
units and with load L1. It has a mean value of 3.5kW and the time step is 1 hour. The 
expected nominal tank autonomy is calculated as 100/3.5= 28.57 hours i.e. the time taken 
to empty the tank when the mean load is applied. The results for the mean nominal tank 
autonomy for the loads considered are given in Fig. 5.19. Using Fig. 5.19 with Fig. 5.13 
and 5.14 the availability for a given tank autonomy can be calculated for various fuel 
delivery delays.  
Stand alone operation and microgrid operation: 
In the standalone operation and in the microgrid operation of the genset, the 
models are directly applicable and the steady state solution can be directly used if the 
pmfs do not change with time. The load values is the load allocated to the genset issued 
in the availability calculations.  
Fuel supply availability back up gensets standby during grid outages: 
 
Fig. 5.20: Timeline of events for the genset refueling system 
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Fig. 5.21 Fuel tank pmf evolution over a period of 10 days for model 4 
In the case of standby operation of the genset a timeline of events for the standby 
operation of the genset is given in Fig. 5.20. Consider a load supplied by the main grid 
with a back up diesel genset with tank capacity C. Let a grid outage occur at time t=0 and 
the genset is brought into operation. Consider the case when the genset starts (an event 
which occurs with some genset start probability say ρGS) when the grid outage occurs and 
the genset is in standby mode with the tank full. Let the restoration time for the grid be Tr. 
Let Tr be measured in hours. In case of grid outage caused by extreme events like tropical 
cyclones or earthquakes the outages could last for days to weeks [Krishnamurthy and 
Kwasinski 2013]. For example, let Tr =240 hours which corresponds to a restoration time 
of 10 days. For finding the genset availability in the time interval [0,Tr] the transient 
solution is found. The transient solution for the fuel tank is given in Fig. 5.21. Note that 
this standby description can also be extended to a microgrid which has a grid connected 
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to it and is facing a grid outage. Thus transient solution can be calculated for the duration 
of a grid outage in the microgrid case. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented four models for deriving the power supply availability of 
diesel gensets with discontinuous fuel supply. The presence of storage was considered 
and its effect on fuel supply availability was analyzed for long and short delays in the fuel 
delivery process. The models for the fuel tank were developed for both deterministic and 
stochastic loads with fuel state independent and independent arrivals. The effect of 
controlling the fuel level at which the fuel order is placed was also found. The nominal 
tank autonomy was calculated for various load values. It was seen that with increasing 
storage, the genset availability increased thereby reducing the dependency on the fuel 
truck delivery system.  The improvement in availability was large for an increase in 
storage for small values of installed capacity. 
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Chapter 6: Microgrids distribution and interfaces 
As mentioned before, microgrids can themselves have the availability issues 
[Kwasinski et al. 2012, Kwasinski 2010, Kwasinski 2011c] for many distributed energy 
resources (DERs). The microgrids however have an advantage because of the existence 
of diversity in its sources. Diversity reduces the dependency on any single source which 
in turn reduces the dependency on any external lifelines [Kwasinski 2010]. Storage is 
another mechanism via which the life dependency can be reduced and it improves 
availability [Kwasinski et al. 2012, Kwasinski 2010, Song et al. 2013]. For diesel gensets, 
storage is in the form of fuel tanks and sometimes in terms of inertial storage like 
flywheels [Zhao et al. 2012]. For renewables, storage options include batteries Song et al. 
2013 and ultra capacitors [Song et al. 2010]. 
A number of approaches have been tried in terms of evaluating on the impact of 
microgrid as well various techniques of using microgrids more useful have been 
studied[Varaiya et al. 2011, Dialynas and Hatziargyriou 2007, Xioahong et al. 2010, 
Falahati et al. 2012]. Renewables are expected to be a major contributor of energy 
especially photovoltaics and wind generators. References [Huang et al. 2011] [Mitra et al. 
2012] studied the reliability of a microgrid with photovoltaics and wind generators. 
References Song et al. 2013, [Bahramirad et al. 2012] and [Kakimoto 2012] studied 
methods to find the optimal storage sizing for a given reliability constraint for microgrids 
with renewables. But the methods are either limited to simulation based techniques or the 
microgrid is limited to specific type of source for example photovoltaics i.e. a lack of 
diversity. The effect of CHP integration into microgrids has been studied by [Basu et al.  
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2010] and the integration of a highly reliability distribution system has been studied in 
[Khodayar et al. 2012].  
Energy storage plays an important role in improvement of power supply 
availability. In the evaluating the energy storage’s capability to supply energy, 
Markovian techniques are becoming popular in modeling the evolution of battery state of 
charge. Such techniques have been employed in renewables Song et al. 2013 [Theristis 
and Papazoglou 2014] which is also employed in this chapter. 
The distribution system of the microgrid is essential is transporting power reliably 
and integrating the various DERs. Various methods of selecting optimal configurations 
for smart microgrids [Erol-Kantarci et al. 2011, Kwasinski 2011d ,Hadjsaid et al. 2010] 
and in this chapter their availability characteristics are studied. 
MICROGRID COMPONENTS 
 In chapter 1 Microgrids are defined as locally confined and independently 
controlled electric power grids in which a distribution network with a given architecture 
integrates distributed energy resources with the loads. The components of the microgrids 
can be broadly classified into four categories; 1) sources 2) loads 3) energy storage 4) 
interfaces. The sources in a microgrid include the main grid, micro turbine, gas gensets, 
diesel gensets and renewable energy sources like photovoltaics and wind turbines. The 
loads, however, are dependent on the specific application under which the microgrid is 
employed which could be hospitals, military bases, ships, remote communities, 
telecommunication systems and campuses. Energy storage includes batteries, fuel tanks, 
compressed air, flywheel and ultra capacitors. Interfaces can comprise of power 
electronics interfaces and protective equipment like circuit breakers in the network. The 
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availability of the microgrid is defined as the probability of being able to serve the 
demand by the DERs given the architecture of the distribution system. 
 Behavior of microgrid components influencing availability: 
Sources:  
A main contributor of to the availability of power supply is the variation in the 
power output of the sources which are due to a number of reasons depending on the 
source. Sources like gensets depend on lifelines such as pipes and transportation 
networks whose availability affects the fuels delivery to the genset that makes the power 
available from genset variable. In case of renewables the natural phenomena make the 
power supply variable [Kennedy and Marden 2009]. 
Energy Storage:  
Energy storage is used to address the stochastic nature in the case of the lifelines 
as well as the variability present in renewables, the energy available from the storage is 
also variable because of the stochastic nature of the sources feeding the storage and well 
as the stochastic nature of the load consuming energy from the storage and other 
phenomena such as leakage and degradation [Song et al. 2013]. 
 
Interfaces : 
Circuit breakers (CBs) are used as protection equipment in a microgrid and power 
electronics interfaces are used for controlling the power flow as well as a measure of 
protection. However they are also subject to failure and repairs. But their availability is 
generally very high in the range of 5 to 6 nines[Kwasinski 2011c].Additionally, the 
reliability of CBs have increased due to the evolution of technology, from air blast, oil 
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minimum, SF6 dual pressure into SF6 single pressure type CBs. Power electronic 
interfaces also have the added advantage of built in redundancy. Power electronics 
interfaces can be configured in a n+1 redundancy or in general an n+m redundancy 
which means n components are minimum required for the interface to function and an 
additional m are added. For a given m as n grows the availability reduces [Kwasinski and 
Krien 2007]. The redundancy works when the components are relatively uncorrelated in 
their failures. The circuit breaker availability can be calculated using a following 
continuous Markov chains representation showing in Fig. 6.1. 
The availability of the circuit breaker with the conductor in series is calculated as 
the probability of being state 11 (both conductor and breaker being in a working state) in 
the state transition diagram of Fig. 6.1.  The state transition rate matrix  is 
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where B   is the breaker repair rate, C  is  the conductor repair rate, B  is the 
breaker failure rate, C is  the conductor failure rate, and   is the breaker failure to open 
probability 
Using typical specifications for highly available circuit breakers [Military 
Reliability Handbook] the failure rates and the repairs rates for the conductor as circuit 
breaker are 32.4  eCB   and 968.1  eCB   with 01.0  which yields 
and availability of 6 nines. 
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Fig. 6.1 Circuit breaker availability model state transition diagram. 
 The CBs and power electronics interfaces can be collectively labeled as 
interfaces in the microgrid for the calculation of availability. The availability of these 
interfaces is important as their availability becomes a scaling factor at each connection of 
a source in a microgrid distribution network. That is, a source is available only if the 
interface connected to it is functional. Therefore while calculating the availability the 
interface availability  are used as scaling factor of availability because of the only if they 
work for the power flows from the source, or power flows into a load. The faults in the 
interfaces are the ones considered as failures in the distribution network for example, 
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short circuit failure modes of CBs and the failure of power electronic interfaces. It is also 
assumed that the failure of the interfaces is independent of each other.  
Availability of the microgrid 
The availability of the microgrid is defined as the probability of serving the load 
demand by the microgrid resources. Therefore a failure to supply any load is considered a 
failure. In other words, the unavailability can be measured as the amount of energy 
deficiency of the system. This energy present of the system can be represented via a 
fitness function defined as follows.  
 
Fig. 6.2 Renewables and energy storage with interfaces, an equivalent representation for 
availability calculations 
Consider a basic setup as shown in Fig. 6.2 wherein a source is powering a load 
supported by a storage unit Let )(tX  be a energy available at source at time t  and )(tB
be the energy available from the storage at time t and )(tL  be the load at time at time t 
then the fitness function )(tG  at time t  is defined as  
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)()()()( tLtBtXtG      (6.2) 
The availability is defined as when the total energy )()( tBtX   available is 
greater than or equal to the load i.e. )()()( tLtBtX   or 0)( tG . Therefore 
availability of the system in Fig. 6.2 is the probability that 0)( tG  . If )(tf X  )(tf B  
)(tfL  are the distributions of )(tX , )(tB  and )(tL at time t  then, 
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In order to compute )(tfG  the distributions )(tf X  )(tfL  and )(tf B  are 
needed .The )(tf B  depends on )(tf X and )(tfL  which is to be derived given the type 
of source. In the next section the modeling of the microgrid DERs is given. Also, note 
that the fitness function shown in (6.1) has no interfaces. The definition can be extended 
in order to incorporate the interfaces which are given in the next section. 
MICROGRID DERS MODELS 
In this chapter three sources are considered to be present in the microgrid: the 
main grid, diesel gensets and photovoltaics. The probabilistic behavior of the power 
output of each of these sources need be to calculated. Each source can come with its own 
associated energy storage. 
Source characteristics with interface: 
Let X be the power output of the source and let 1A be an indicator random variable 
such that the interface is in a working state. Then the power output at the interface 
terminal is XX A1
~
. Let Af and Xf be the probability mass functions (pmf) of the 
interface and the source respectively. The pmf of X
~
 denoted by
X
f ~  is given by the 
following formula: 

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Renewables and energy storage with interfaces: 
 The energy storage model with PV is derived from the work in Song et al. 2013 
and extended to include the interface. The energy storage dynamics without interfaces is 
given by the following equation Song et al. 2013. 
  mBtLtXtBtB ),()()(min,0max)1(    (6.5) 
This is equation is linear in the interval  mB,0 however when interfaces are 
included using (4) the equation becomes,  
  mBtLttXttBtB ),(
~
)()(
~
)()(min,0max)1(
BB AA
11     (6.6) 
The above process is represented by a Markov chain similar to the one in [Song et 
al. 2013], the transitions in the battery state. For calculations, here it is assumed that the 
battery SOC distribution )(tf B  is already known which can be calculated using the 
method in [Song et al. 2013] with the modification required for the interfaces as indicated 
in (6.5). The state transition diagram or such a Markov chain is shown in Fig 4.15. The 
focus of this chapter is to calculate the availability in the presence of a distribution 
network. Note that in (6.1), the calculation of the fitness function, the storage element is 
treated like a source. Then the output of the battery along with its interface is 
)()()(
~
tBttB
BA
1  with the pmf calculated using (6.4).  
Diesel gensets with interfaces: 
Diesel genets depend on a fuel supply for generating power. In extreme 
conditions, the fuel supply to the diesel genset is discontinuous. The genset can supply 
power only if there is sufficient fuel being supplied to the genset via some mechanism 
whether it is a pipeline or a fuel tank. The discontinuity of fuel supply is mitigated by the 
presence of storage, but the tank needs to be refueled by a refueling system usually 
composed of trucks. There, however, is a lead time or delay associated with each 
refueling instance from the time when it is demanded. The evolution of the fuel tank 
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states as in the case of the battery state of charge is modeled using a Markov chain but 
with lead times. In case of fuel state independent truck arrivals, this could be the case 
when multiple diesel generators are involved, as in the case of a microgrid, the fuel 
supply availability is taken as the refueling probability. The refueling probability denoted 
as b in the state transition diagram for the Markov chain of the fuel tank in Fig. 5.5. In a 
standalone diesel genset system powering the load the fitness function for the diesel 
genset and load is  
)()()( tLtFtG      (6.7) 
Where )(tF  is the energy proportional to the volume of fuel in the fuel tank. For 
evaluating the output of the diesel genset with an interface the )(tF  is replaced with 
)()(
~
tFtF
CBFW
1  and the fitness function becomes  
)()(
~
)( tLtFtG      (6.8) 
The distribution for the energy output for the genset can be calculated with (6.4).  
Model of the main power grid 
The model for the grid under tropical cyclones was derived in Chapter 3. The 
availability function can be directly used here which is given by 
fDAfgrid ptptpptA  1))()(()(    (6.9) 
 The capacity of the grid is assumed to be infinite i.e. if there is a grid then any 
and all of the load may be supported by it as a long as there is a path to the load from the 
grid tie point via the distribution network. In order to make the calculations of the 
availability via the fitness function, two approaches are possible while considering the 
presence of the grid. The first approach is, the grid capacity is set to the sum of the 
maximum load. Therefore  
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The second approach is to condition on the absence of the grid i.e. the grid being 
out and calculate the microgrid availability. The total microgrid availability using the 
second method is: 
g ridg ridn o g rid AUAA     (6.11) 
However, the above formula needs to be used according to the type of distribution 
network used to connect the microgrid. The second approach is the simpler of the two 
and is used while considering the radial and ladder distributions because it simplifies the 
calculation whereas for the ring distribution the first approach is used as the formula 
needs to account for which leg of the ring the grid is connected to which increases the 
number of terms in the equation. In next the section, effects of architectures are discussed 
in calculating the overall microgrid availability. Also, note that the time variable in (6.11) 
is omitted for ease of notation. The availability equations are nonetheless to be calculated 
for each time t. In the flowing section the suppressed notation is used and it is to be 
understood that all availability equations derived in Section IV are functions of time  
MICROGRID ARCHITECTURES 
Microgrids are generally connected using one of the three architectures, radial, 
ring and ladder [Kwasinski and Krien 2007]. Radial architecture is one of the most 
popular architectures used [Guerrero 2013] owing to its simplicity. The microgrid 
availability is largely dependent on the configuration of the connections of the various 
sources and grids via interfaces. This section derives availability formulae for the 
microgrid for each of the microgrid distribution architectures. 
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Radial Microgrid: 
The radial architecture is commonly used as distribution architecture for 
microgrids. Consider a general radial architecture in Fig. 6.3. The loads get power only if 
the interfaces at the load are all working. Let ai be the availability of the ith interface and 
CBLW  the set of working states of the load interface. The set of working states is a 
singleton with all the interfaces working.  
 
Fig. 6.3 Schematic of a Radial microgrid with 3 loads, 1 PV with 3 batteries and 3 diesel 
genset and a grid tie  
The radial microgrid formula is: 
                              
                                   (6.12) 
                         (6.13) 
                                       (6.14) 
                 (6.15) 
 In the microgrid it is assumed that the genset is called into action only when the 
PV and the batteries are insufficient to serve the load i.e. the diesel genset is only used to  
serve the part of the load that cannot be served by the PV and the battery. Therefore, 
while calculating the diesel genset pmf, the load seen by the genset is: 
 
 )}()()({)( tLtBtXtL Tot alPVgs      (6.16) 
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When the fitness function is calculated all similar sources are lumped. The diesel 
genset are lumped together and the photovoltaics are lumped together and the loads are 
lumped together. Once lumped, the 
F
f ~ ,
p vX
f ~ and
B
f ~  are used to find the overall 
microgrid availability. In the presence of the grid the radial availability formula is 
                                     (6.17) 
Ring Microgrid 
Consider the ring microgrid in Fig 6.4. As in the radial case the loads get power 
only if the interfaces at the load are all working. Let 
iCBL
a  be the availability of the 
interface at the ith load. Let    be the set of sources for the left leg of the ring and    the 
set of sources for the right leg of the ring    be the set of all sources. Similarly, let 
   ,    and     be the set of loads for the left leg the right leg and all loads respectively.  
 
Fig. 6.4 Schematic of a Ring microgrid with 3 loads, 2 PV with 2 batteries and 2 diesel 
genset and a grid tie 
The connectivity of the ring is primarily controlled by the states of the interfaces 
on the bus, e1 and e2. If either one of them is working then each load can be served by 
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each source therefore the purpose of availability calculation the distribution network is 
similar to the radial network. When both 
1e  and 2e  are both failed then the left and 
right legs of the ring get separated and the fitness function of each leg has to be 
considered and the availability under the condition of the ring being separated and the 
condition when both legs are working i.e. the probability that the fitness function of the 
left and right legs are non negative. The ring availability formula is therefore 
                    
                            
                                         (6.18) 
The probability of both bus interfaces being off is the product of the unavailability 
of the bus interfaces which               and the probability of either one being on is  
                     .Then` 
                    
                                       
0 (1     )           (6.19)  
The total load interface availability is the product of the availability of the 
interfaces at the load 
                           (6.20) 
The load interface availability for the left leg and right legs are 
                      
                          
    (6.21) 
Therefore, 
                                                   
0             (6.22) 
The fitness function for the full ring is 
                             (6.23) 
The fitness functions for the left and right legs are 
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    (6.24) 
Also note that  rlx GGG   which means that that once 
lG
f  and 
rG
f  are 
known 
xG
f  can also be evaluated as 
rlx GGG
fff  . 
Let 
 )0(  xx GPA  , )0(  ll GPA , )0(  rr GPA   (6.25) 
then the ring microgrid availability formula is 
))((()(
211 xrleexCBLCBLG
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N
    (6.26) 
In ring microgrids the load seen by a given storage element is dependent on its 
location. Consider a very simple case, with one PV, one battery and one load on each leg 
of the ring. When at least one of the bus interfaces are in the on state, the batteries share 
the load Ll and Lr but when the bus interfaces are off the load on Bl is Ll and the load on 
Br is Lr. In this case, two separate markov chains need to calculated for this condition 
alone for each of the batteries which increases the complexity of the problem, however if 
the probability of the for highly available interfaces the probability of not sharing the load 
is low. Therefore, when the buses are separated it can then be assumed that the batteries 
have an energy sharing proportional to their capacity. 
Ladder Microgrid: 
The availability calculation of a ladder microgrid is also similar to the radial 
microgrid. The basic schematic is given in Fig. 6.5. Consider the interfaces connecting 
the DERs and loads to the buses as shown in Fig. 6.5. In order for the load to be served or 
the DERs to remain connected to the rest of the system at least one of the interfaces on 
the leg needs to work. This is the case for every leg. Therefore for the purpose of 
availability calculations the two interfaces can be replaced by a single interface with an 
availability corresponding to an equivalent condition that at least one of the interfaces is 
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working as shown in Fig. 6.6. The replacement is done as follows. Let la and ra  be the 
availability of the left and right interface. The availability of the equivalent interface ea
is 
lrrlrle aaaaaaa  )1)(1(1   (6.27) 
Replacing the interfaces on each leg of the ladder by their equivalent interface 
with a single bus in the distribution the problem reduces to finding the availability of the 
equivalent radial network shown in Fig.6.7. 
)0(
)|()|(

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
   (6.28) 
where
NCBLCBLCBLCBL
aaaA 
21
     (6.29) 
are the equivalent interfaces availabilities and the set of working states CBLW are 
such that the equivalent interfaces are working.  
 
Fig. 6.5 Ladder microgrid 
 
Fig. 6.6 Interface connection equivalent representation 
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Fig. 6.7 Equivalent radial representation of a ladder network for availability calculations 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The equations derived in the previous section are at all time dependent, however 
each of the DERs operate at different times scales. This is especially true during extreme 
events like natural disasters like tropical cyclones and earthquakes. During tropical 
cyclones and earthquakes grid outages can last for days and weeks whereas the diesel 
gensets and PV resources and load evolve in much smaller times scales. Compared to the 
grid restoration the DERs are assumed to be in their steady state operation. Therefore the 
only time dependence of the availability is of the main grid when the microgrid 
availability with the grid is considered. Typical failure time, wait time and repair time 
parameters for the grid are given for triangular densities in table 6.2. These are 
discretized and used in the formula for calculating the grid availability. The grid outage 
probability is assumed to be 0.75 which corresponds to a value of L=6.4 which 
correspond to areas like Suffolk in New York during Super-storm Sandy [Krishnamurthy 
and Kwasinski 2013]. The plot for the grid availability versus time is given in Fig. 6.8 for 
the parameters in Table 6.1.  
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Fig. 6.8 Time dependent grid availability during tropical cyclones with grid outage 
probability 0.75. 
 
 
Fig. 6.9  Load Probability mass function 
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Fig. 6.10 Load seen by the microgrid with load interface availability of 6-nines 
 
Fig 6.11  PV output probability mass function for parameters in Table II. 
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Fig. 6.12 Truck arrival density evaluated at 1 hour step 
 (Hours) Fail time Wait time Repair time 
Ti 0 0 0 
Td 5 6 72 
Tm 10 10 240 
Table 6.1: Grid Parameters  
Load (kw) 1 2 3 4 5 
P 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
N 7 13 17 23 29 
Mean 3.5 6.5 8.5 11.5 14.5 
Max  7 13 17 23 29 
Variance 1.75 3.25 4.25 5.75 7.25 
Table 6.2: Load Parameters 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
hours
f i
Fuel truck arrival time  probability mass function
 
 
T
i
=8	T
d
=11	T
m
=15
T
i
=11	T
d
=15	T
m
=18
T
i
=13	T
d
=17	T
m
=23
T
i
=15	T
d
=20	T
m
=26
 T
i
=17	T
d
=24	T
m
=30
 120 
PV input exponential parameter 0.0038 W
-1
 
Total installed PV capacity 10 kW 
Mean PV input per unit area 260 W/m
2
 
Panel conversion efficiency 15% 
Area of array installed 26.67 m
2
 
Mean output of array 1.05 kW 
Peak output of array 10 kW 
Circuit breaker/PE. Interface availability 0.999999[Maish 1999] 
Table 6.3: Photovoltaics and interface battery parameters 
 (Hours) 1 2 3 4 5 
Ti 8 11 13 15 17 
Td 11 15 17 20 24 
Tm 15 18 23 26 30 
Table 6.4: Fuel Delivery pmf Parameters 
The insolation data used here was collected in Austin, Texas, from 7 am to 7 pm 
for 7 months from Song et al. 2013. A typical 250 W PV panel from [Solar tech Data 
Sheet] has 15.3 % efficiency and 1.51 m
2
 are used for the calculations. The PV array 
hence constructed has the parameters given in Table 6.2. The load is assumed to be 
binomial with parameters given in Table 6.3 and whose pmfs without and with interfaces 
are given in Figs. 6.9 and 6.10 respectively. The PV output pmf is given in Fig. 6.11. The 
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interfaces in general are assumed to have an availability of 6-nines as derived for the 
circuit breakers [Kwasinski 2011c]. 
 The fuel delivery arrivals are calculated using triangular densities whose 
parameters values and the refueling probabilities are given in table IV. The plot of the 
fuel truck arrival densities are given in Fig. 6.12. 
Using the above data for the microgrid DERs, the availability for each of the 
architectures radial, ring and ladder are calculated for various configurations of sources, 
interfaces, storage and loads. The results for the radial, ring and ladder are presented to 
discuss the effects of the various DERs and architecture on the availability of the 
microgrid. 
 
Fig. 6.13 Radial microgrid without grid availability vs tank capacity with PV with battery 
size Battery size 10kwh for load L1  
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Fig. 6.14 Radial microgrid without grid availability vs tank capacity with PV with battery 
size battery size 20kwh for Load L1 
As mentioned before the PV sources are lumped together and the genset sources 
are lumped together. The diesel genset supports the portion of the load that the PV and 
the battery are not able to serve. For the radial configuration, in the absence of the grid 
the availability of the PV with a battery of capacity 10 kWh for load L1 is 0.81598 and 
the same PV system with a battery of capacity 20 kWh for load L1 is 0.96991. On the 
introduction of a diesel genset with a tank of capacity 40 kWh and a refueling probability 
or fuel delivery availability of 0.081 The availability improves to 0.9985 for the battery 
of 10kWh and to 0999994 for the battery of size 20 kWh. The plot of the availability 
versus tank capacity for the radial microgrid for the PV with 10 kWh battery capacity for 
load L1 is given in Fig. 6.13 for various fuel delivery arrival time densities. It is seen that 
even for very low fuel delivery availabilities there is a significant improvement in 
availability by the addition of a genset with a fuel tank. A similar plot of availability 
versus tank capacity is shown for a battery of 20 kWh in the same system in Fig. 6.14. 
The improvement in availability, for a mean fuel arrival time of 11.33 hours, which is the 
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highest fuel delivery among the ones considered, beyond 100 kWh is small with a minor 
change only in the 8th decimal places. The results indicate that microgrid with the lower 
fuel delivery availability responds better to an increase in storage compared to a 
microgrid with higher fuel delivery availability. This can be seen from a closer scrutiny 
of the curves for availability vs. tank capacity for the radial microgrid in Fig. 6.13 and 
6.14. The results indicate that increasing the storage produces greater improvement in 
availability for smaller values of fuel delivery availability. For example, for the microgrid 
with the 20 kWh battery, increasing the tank capacity from 100 kWh to 110 kWh for the 
second fuel delivery functions with mean 14.66 hours produces an improvement of 1 
nine. The improvement in the availability demonstrates that the presence of storage can 
improve the availability of the microgrid as well the added diversity improves the 
availability. 
A similar argument can be made for the case of incorporating renewables in a 
microgrid which has primarily depended on diesel gensets for improving the availability 
of the microgrid power supply to its loads. 
The microgrid availability is limited by the availability of the interfaces in the 
microgrid. In specific the microgrid availability is bounded above by term CBLA  which is 
the product of the availability of the circuit breakers connected at the load when the load 
is more dispersed (more load units for the same total load) the overall availability reduces 
due to the reduction in value of CBLA  however the grouping of the load leads to 
increasing the single point of failures with the microgrid system at the load interface. 
Therefore in order to obtain better design of a highly available system, choices need to be 
made in how to configure the placement of the load within the microgrid distribution. 
The ring microgrid for the same set of sources as above can be connect in a 
number of configuration by choosing the bus for connection for each microgrid 
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component. If everything is connected to the same bus then the availability is equal to 
that of a radial architecture as seen from the ring availability formula. The worst case or 
the case with the lowest availability is when all the DERs are on one bus and all the loads 
are on the other bus. The results for availability versus tank capacity with a PV with 
battery of 20 kWh are shown in the Fig. 6.15 with bus circuit breakers having 6 nines 
availability. 
 
Fig. 6.15 Ring microgrid without grid availability vs tank capacity with PV with battery 
size battery size 20kwh for Load L1 
The ladder network calculations are exactly the same as the radial network when 
the interfaces on each leg are replaced by their equivalent. The presence of the additional 
interfaces improves the interface availability in each leg of the ladder network. This 
behaves like the redundancy for the power electronics interfaces with n=1 and m=1. For 
the interfaces considered here the left and right legs interface have al= ar=0.999999 i.e. 
6-nines. The equivalent interface availability ae is )1)(1(1 rle aaa   which is 12 nines. 
Now consider a microgrid with the same components as the radial microgrid in the 
previous example but connected in a ladder configuration. The resulting plots for the tank 
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capacity versus ladder microgrid availability without the grid are shown in Fig. 6.16. At 
tank capacity 40 kWh the availability is 0.9999954. It can be seen that the amount of 
resources required can be large to improve availability by 1 nine depending on the 
component and its function in the microgrid. 
 
Fig. 6.16 Ladder microgrid without grid availability vs tank capacity with PV with 
battery size battery size 20kwh for Load L1 
Comparison of radial, ring and ladder architecture in the presence of interfaces:  
The equivalent availability graph for radial and ring distribution architecture are 
shown in Fig. 2.21. As seen, the graphical availability representation which is the model 
for calculating the performance from the ring network is different from its electrical 
network representation. In the graph the edges are the interfaces and the nodes are the 
buses, DERs and loads. Therefore under the condition that loads and DERs are 
disconnected, availability drops. However, the benefits of the ring architecture might be 
further analyzed when the failures and repairs among the various components of the 
microgrid become correlated; i.e. in the case there are others benefits that could arise 
from separating the loads from the DERs, which is a topic for further research.  When 
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comparing the numerical availability results for radial, ring and ladder architectures for 
the same set of sources and load it was observed, as expected, that the ladder has better 
availability that than of the ring and radial. The comparison is done using an islanded 
microgrid with the PV, 20kWh battery, 40 kWh fuel storage serving load L1. The better 
performance of the ladder is due to the presence of a redundant interface for each DER 
and load. When comparing the ring and radial network, it can be seen that in the best 
case, the ring can do as well as the radial network i.e. their availabilities are equal, and in 
the worse case the ring availability reduces, their values are given in Table 6.5 for bus 
circuit breakers availabilities of 4 and 6 nines respectively. 
 
Fig. 6.17: Availability graph representation of radial and ring networks for the case of 2 
generators 2 storage and 2 Loads for the availability model of the 
distributions architectures with interfaces each edge represent an interface 
connection. Buses, sources, storage and loads are indicated by the nodes. 
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Fig. 6.18 Radial microgrid with grid availability vs time with PV with battery size 20kwh 
and tank capacity 40 kWh for Load L1  
 
Fig. 6.19 Radial microgrid with grid availability in number of nines vs time with PV with 
battery size 20kwh and tank capacity 40 kWh for Load L1  
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The above calculations have been so far limited to considering the grid absent. 
The grid is now incorporated by using the grid availability formula. The resulting time 
dependent availability function is given in Fig. 6.18. The same result but in terms of 
number of nines is given in Fig. 6.19. On comparing Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.19 it can be seen 
that the incorporation of diverse energy sources like renewables and diesel gensets the 
load can be supported with sufficient availability during extreme events. The type of 
source and the amount of storage that is required for each source is dependent on external 
life lines. But it can be seen that the presence of storage reduces the dependency on the 
lifeline by increasing availability even when the availability of fuel from the lifeline is 
quite low as indicated in table 6.4.  
On comparing the availability results for radial, ring and ladder architectures for 
the same set of sources and load it was observed, as expected, the ladder has better 
availability that than of the ring and radial. The comparison is done using an islanded 
microgrid with the PV, 20kWh battery, 40 kWh fuel storage serving load L1. The better 
performance of the ladder is due to the presence of a redundant interface for each DER 
and load.   
Architecture type Interface availability Bus aCB Microgrid Availability 
Radial 6 nines NA 5.2218 nines 
Ring 6 nines 6 nines 5.2217 nines  
Ring 6 nines 4 nines 5.2211 nines 
Ladder 6 nines NA 5.337 nines 
Table 6.5: Microgrid availability by architecture, for Load L1, battery capacity 20 kWh, 
Tank capacity 40 kWh. 
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On comparing the ring and radial network, it can be seen that in the best case, the 
ring can do as well as the radial network i.e. their availabilities are equal, and in the 
worse case the ring availability reduces, their values are given in Table 6.5 for bus circuit 
breakers availabilities of 4 and 6 nines, respectively. However, for very highly 
availability interface availabilities the difference in the availabilities between the 
infrastructures is minute. This is because relative to the contribution of the storage, 
lifeline and renewable system the interface availability for computational purposes is 
essentially 1. In fact, in the next chapter where the ICT site availability case studies are 
presented, the interface availability is assumed to be 1 to simplify the analysis. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter discussed the microgrid availability modeling for quantifying the 
availability of microgrid with interface and three distribution architectures. The microgrid 
availability formulae for typical microgrid distribution architectures like the radial ring 
and ladder architectures were derived. A diverse set of sources in renewables, diesel 
genset and the main grid were considered in the availability calculations in the presence 
of storage and discontinuous fuel supply. It was found that the radial availability formula 
can be used as a building block in order to derive the formulae for the ring and ladder 
networks. The power supply availability was calculated for typical values of grid failure 
and restoration characteristics observed during tropical cyclones. It was seen that the 
incorporation of storage and a diverse set of sources in the form of a microgrid can 
greatly improve power supply availability during extreme events like tropical cyclones 
when the microgrid goes into island mode.  
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 The next chapter uses the developed availability framework and studies ICT 
facilities availability during three major hurricanes namely Katrina, Ike and Sandy that 
affected the United States this past decade. 
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Chapter 7: Case Studies: Empirically validated availability model 
of information and communication technologies facilities under 
hurricane conditions  
INTRODUCTION: 
 This chapter presents cases studies studying the performance of power 
infrastructure for information and communication technology (ICT) sites during 
hurricanes with the aid of the models developed in the previous chapters. Information and 
communication technology sites are selected because they represent an important 
example of a critical load that is not considered as such by electric utilities even when 
numerous federal and state agencies, such as the DHS, have identified communications as 
a critical service and national infrastructure. Most of the past works on this topic tend to 
describe performance of communication networks without including availability models 
or quantifying information and communication technology (ICT) sites performance with 
actual data collected in past events. Furthermore, although there exists a good number of 
studies realizing availability models of communication facilities power plants under 
normal operating conditions, these models present significant gaps even in basic critical 
components. For example, models of standby diesel generators exclude the impact of the 
fuel delivery process using a transportation network—which is, then, defined as a lifeline 
for the ICT site—on the diesel generator availability. That is, past models of standby 
gensets consider fuel supply with a perfect availability or with an unrealistic model. This 
chapter uses the models developed in the research to analyze the ICT sites performance 
during hurricanes and in their aftermath. The use of the developed models in the research 
presents the following novel aspects to the study of the ICT site behavior during 
hurricanes. Using the model for the diesel fuel delivery and tank, the effect of lifelines 
 132 
such as roads and transportation infrastructure performance on overall availability of the 
ICT plant can be calculated.  The field damage assessments enable the validation of the 
model and the data used.  The impact of the energy storage on availability can also be 
studied using the models developed. The characterization of hurricane intensity presented 
in the earlier reports enables how a particular ICT system is affected. 
The focus of this study is the ICT sites during hurricanes Katrina (2005), Ike 
(2008) and Sandy (2012).  The data for which is obtained from NOAA, the utilities and 
network operators in the region affected by these hurricanes and field assessments. Of the 
regions surveyed, the coastal regions were affected the most during these hurricanes due 
to storm surge, high winds and high exposure time. Next an overview of hurricane history 
for Katrina, Ike and Sandy is given and observations from the field damage assessments 
exemplified using photographs taken in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane in the 
affected region. Following this, the mathematical availability framework developed in the 
previous chapters is adapted to study the behavior of ICT sites during hurricanes. 
ICT SITES DURING HURRICANES 
Hurricane history: 
Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina originated in the Atlantic Ocean near the Bahamas and made 
multiples landfalls in the United States of America, first in Florida and second the state of 
Louisiana as category 2 hurricane [Kwasinski et al. 2009]. The most affected parishes 
were Plaquemines, New Orleans St. Bernard, Jefferson parishes and areas along Lake 
Ponchartrain. ICT site damages during Katrina were located mostly near the coastal areas 
with very little sites actually experiencing complete physical damage. Most sites 
primarily lost power due to damaged batteries and the loss of the mains power supply. 
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These outages were worsened due fuel supply disruption. Poor construction practices like 
not placing equipment on raised platforms were also a common issue. [Kwasinski et al. 
2009]. This chapter uses the model to calculate ICT site availability for various locations 
given the characteristics of the fuel supply disruption using the methods of chapter 5. 
Ike 
Hurricane Ike made landfall in the United State of America in Galveston Bay, TX 
in 2008. The coastal areas in Chambers county and Galveston County were the hardest 
hit with wind speeds in the excess of category 2 hurricane. Thousands of people lost 
power all the way from the Gulf coast to the interior of Texas. An important observation 
from field damage assessments was that the damage distribution confined mostly 
distribution system of the grid was spatially inhomogeneous. As in the case of Katrina, 
many ICT sites experienced power supply issues due to fuel starvation and drained 
batteries. 
Sandy: 
Sandy made land fall in the United States of America in the east coast of the 
United States of America as a category 1 hurricane [NOAA]. Sandy threatened many 
states in the northeast as it moved towards the coast with a total wind swath area of 1.4 
million square miles in the ocean [Wunderground 2012]. However, it did considerably 
diminish as it made landfall on the New Jersey and New York coast.  
 
ICT Site Behavior: 
The ICT sites considered here are Central offices, Cell sites and Digital Loop 
Carriers (DLCs). The failure modes primarily observed during these ICT site outages are 
due to power supply issues. This is true not only during hurricane but other disasters such 
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as earthquakes [Dueñas-Osorio and Kwasinski 2012]. Power issues have been identified 
as the predominant cause of ICT site loss of service. Additionally, field observations 
during Katrina, Ike and Sandy indicate that due to long refueling times that in those 
places with heavy flooding and blocked roads, ICT sites with gensets as backup lost 
power due to running out of fuel [Kwasinski 2011b]. Examples of some central offices, 
cell sites and DLC affected during Katrina are shown in figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. Flooding 
issues were a common cause of ICT site damages. Many facility doors were not water 
tight which lead to failed batteries [Kwasinski et al. 2009]. These flooding issues were 
present in the other hurricanes as well. 
 
Fig. 7.1.  Central office during Katrina with diesel fuel tank 
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Fig. 7.2.  Cell site in New Orleans after Katrina 
 
Fig 7.3. DLC system powered by genset after Katrina. 
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Figure 7.4 shows one of the few cell sites that survived in Bolivar peninsula.  
Most of the infrastructure we completely wiped out due to the extremely large storm 
surge with range greater than 10 feet. Most communication infrastructure if not destroyed 
lost power due to loss of mains power supply. DLCs were powered by portable gensets if 
they could be reached given the conditions of the transportation network as shown in 
Fig.7.5.  However many cell sites and DLCs that were on the coast were destroyed as 
sown in Fig. 7.6 and 7.7. 
 
 
Fig 7.4. Cell site in Bolivar peninsula during Hurricane Ike [Kwasinski 2008a] 
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Fig. 7.5. Failed DLC during Hurricane Ike due to loss of power [Kwasinski 2008a] 
 
Fig 7.6. Hurricane Ike , Sabine TX, Central office destroyed[Kwasinski 2008a] 
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Fig. 7.7 Destroyed Cell site and DLC Hurricane Ike [Kwasinski 2008a] 
Flooding issues were again seen during Sandy, for example, a central office 
during Sandy is shown in Fig. 7.8. Fig. 7.9 shows crews pumping flood water out of a 
central office in Manhattan in New York City. Fig. 7.10 shows a cell site located on top 
of the building with generators on the bottom, which is one of many sites wherein there 
was no cabling so that a portable generator maybe connected during the loss of power 
supply. Additional cable shad to be run down the building in order to keep the cell site 
operational [Kwasinski 2012]. 
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Fig. 7.8 Flooded central office after hurricane Sandy [Kwasinski 2012a] 
 
Fig. 7.9.  Water being pumped out of the central office in Manhattan after Sandy 
[Kwasinski 2012a] 
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Fig. 7.10.  Rooftop cell site in Rockaway Peninsula, New York 
In the analysis that follows, the areas where in the ICT site performance is 
studied, the areas are classified into various zones for each hurricane. These zones 
indicate the amount of delay experienced by the fuel trucks that deliver fuel to the ICT 
site. It must be noted here that the delay time is a random variable. Therefore, each ICT 
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site experiences a delay independent of other ICT sites that maybe present in the zone. 
The triangular delay model is used for the fuel truck delivery time distribution in this 
chapter as done in Fig. 5.4. For each zone, the ICT sites experience the same delay 
characteristics. The analysis is conducted for only the first fuel delivery cycle, which is 
the most important cycle because the longest delays are expected during this period and 
grid power can be out during this period. 
The schematic of a typical ICT site power supply system given below, in Fig. 
7.11. The basic components are the mains power, genset and tank, the fuel delivery truck, 
rectifiers, battery and load. During hurricanes the availability of the rectifiers compared 
to the rest of the component is relatively very high. Therefore, for the case study 
presented here the rectifiers can be assumed to operating at availability 1. This 
assumption simplifies the analysis. The energy consumption of an ICT site can be 
variable and it is dependent on traffic [Lorincz et al. 2012] and the exact capacity 
information in terms of energy stored might not be available. However, the storage 
elements can be represented using their autonomy times. Each ICT site has a specific fuel 
tank autonomy depending on the type. The battery back up values can vary based on type 
and location of the ICT site. In both cases, battery and fuel tank, the autonomy time is 
considered as a measure of capacity (in case capacity in terms of state of charge or 
volumes of fuel is given, the autonomy can be calculated using the methods outlined in 
chapter 5 for calculating autonomy). The models for the case study are given next. 
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Fig.  7.11 ICT site power supply schematic  
MODELS FOR ICT SITE POWER SUPPLY COMPONENTS  
Main power grid  
Probability of failure of the power grid to an ICT site at can be estimated via the 
fraction of customers losing power. If n out of m customers have lost power in a given 
area the probability that a given ICT site has lost power is n/m. This is due to the fact the 
most ICT site are connect at the distribution level. Therefore the probability of losing 
power from the grid for an ICT site can be found as the fraction of customers losing 
power in that county or parish. Therefore the grid availability is 
                        (7.1) 
Diesel fuel delivery availability 
In chapter 1, the models for fuel delivery and fuel tank were derived using 
markov chains. The availability of the truck was represented by b=P(F=SRF)  the long 
term fraction of time the fuel truck spends in the refueling state characterized by the 
triangular arrival density. However, here the unavailability of the genset system is 
calculated for the first cycle, therefore the unavailability of the whole genset system is the 
probability that the fuel is depleted before the truck arrives. Therefore the overall power 
supply availability of the genset is  
 143 
                     
                                                          
   (7.2) 
                           
Batteries: 
Typical ICT sites are also equipped with a battery backup. Given that there is no 
power available from the mains grid and the diesel genset, the batteries provide the 
additional autonomy. Thus under such a condition, the unavailability of the power supply 
system will be the probability that the batteries are drained before diesel genset or the 
mains grid comes back online. The unavailability is thus the probability that the ICT site 
power supply is under the condition that there is not enough fuel in the tank to support 
the load and the battery autonomy time is less than the fuel delivery time when the grid is 
off given that there is no mains grid and.  The unavailability without the grid is therefore 
                                (7.3) 
 The above formula is sufficient in the present analysis to calculate the 
unavailability of the genset plus battery under the original assumption of the highly 
available rectifier. In the case the rectifier availability is also to be included to improve 
the availability estimate, the following modification needs to be done in order to calculate 
the unavailability. Let Tr be the restoration time of the grid and let   
  be the fuel arrival 
time. Now define, the variable       which measures the time that some power is 
available to the load other than the battery (either the genset or grid  
               
          (7.4) 
Then unavailability is  
                                                (7.5) 
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 Where the CDF               is calculated using the following formula 
(3.6), if    and     are independent.   
                      
 
 
                                          
                    ) (7.6) 
  The above analysis is derived using models from [Kwasinski et al. 2012, 
Kwasinski 2011] wherein the power supply availability for an ICT site in standby mode 
was developed.  The analysis here is a simplified version of the models developed in 
those papers as it considers only the first refueling cycle for the genset in the various 
zones after the hurricane. From [Kwasinski 2011], the overall system availability under 
constant repair and failure rates for the ICT site shown in Fig. 7.11 is  
                 
                      
        (7.7) 
Where             is the probability that grid is in a failed state, aD is the overall 
rate at which the power supply going from a state of having a grid failure with rectifiers 
and genset working where as aF is the overall repair rate of the system i.e. the sum of the 
transition rates from the set of failed to working states. In (7.7) TD is the fuel tank 
autonomy and Tbat is the battery time.  The complete details of the Markov chain model 
for the derivation of (7.7) are in [Kwasinski 2011].  
As mentioned before, in this report, the calculations are restricted to the first 
refueling cycle, and for only the highly available rectifier with the assumption Arectifier =1 
in order to illustrate the effect of the infrastructure dependency for the standby genset. 
From the grid model developed in chapter 2 and data observed form previous hurricanes, 
it was seen that grid outages can extend for several weeks and in the first cycle of the fuel 
delivery. Therefore, it is highly likely that if the ICT site was experiencing a grid outage, 
then the grid outage would have existed during the time of the first refueling cycle. 
Therefore, for the grid model, it can be assumed the grid is failed with the probability pf 
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obtained by the grid failure probability equation (7.1).  Therefore, overall unavailability 
including the grid for the first cycle is found as  
                                         (7.8) 
Where Ubat is the probability that the fuel in the tank and the battery are drained 
before a fuel arrival (found using (7.3)) and the Ugrid is the probability that there is a grid 
outage (found using (7.1)). The data for  pf is given in table 7.1. The data for the tank 
capacity     and battery capacity     is given in table 7.2. 
Results and Discussion: ICT site availability  
 The zones for Katrina, Ike and Sandy are shown in Figs 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14. The 
delay parameters for the fuel truck delivery time are given in table 3.1 and the 
corresponding triangular fuel arrival densities are plotted in Fig. 7.15, 7.16 and 7.17 
indicating each zone.  The fuel tank and battery data for the ICT sites types namely 
Central office, cell sites, and DLC are given in Table 7.2. The grid outage probabilities 
for each zone are derived from historic data obtained county-wise/ parish-wise for each 
of these hurricanes as shown in table 7.3. These values are used for calculating the grid 
unavailability. Using the formulae discussed above, the unavailability, zone wise for each 
hurricane, for each ICT site type are given in table 7.4 for Katrina, table 7.5 for Ike and 
table 7.6 for Sandy.  
Among the zones, zone 1 has the most intense outages with longest restoration 
times for any infrastructure present in the area. The long delay zones are typically located 
on the coastal regions where the storm surge action is maximum, which results in flooded 
roads and submerged lines making logistics difficult. The high delays are also generally 
restricted to coastal counties in these three hurricanes such as Plaquemines and St. 
Bernard during Katrina. Central offices in zone 3 and 4 do better and have relatively 
 146 
lower unavailability for the first cycle of fuel delivery. In zone 1, the unavailability for all 
ICT site infrastructure without grid power is 1. This is because of the extremely long 
delays experienced by the fuel trucks trying to access these zones.  In fact, the fuel and 
battery back times are in some cases an order of magnitude apart as shown in Table 7.1 
and 7.2.  In various zones the battery back time can vary as seen in Table 7.2. Therefore, 
the unavailability, Ubatmin and Umin  are calculated when the smallest battery capacity is 
used and correspondingly Ubatmax and Umax when the maximum is used. For any ICT site 
with any other battery capacity in the range [Tbatmin, Tbatmax], the unavailability of the 
system with only batteries and genset will be between the Ubatmin, and Ubatmax and the 
overall unavailability including the grid will be between Umin and Umax.. 
 
 
Fig. 7.12. Katrina: Louisiana, Zonal classification for various fuel delivery delays. Delays 
given in Table 7.1 
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Fig. 7.13  Ike, Texas, Zonal classification for various fuel delivery delays. Delays given 
in Table 7.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.14  Sandy, New Jersey and New York, Zonal classification for various fuel 
delivery delays. Delays given in Table 7.1 
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Hurricane zone Ti(days) Td(days) Tm(days) Mean delay  pf 
Katrina 1 20 30 45 31.67 1 
Katrina 2 7 15 30 17.33 1 
Katrina 3 2 5 10 5.67 0.99 
Katrina 4 2 3 7 4 0.99 
Ike 1 7 15 30 17.33 1 
Ike 2 2 4 7 4.33 1 
Ike 3 1 2 3 2 0.97 
Sandy 1 2 4 7 4.33 0.93 
Sandy 2 1 3 5 3 0.76 
Sandy 3 1 2 3 2 0.5 
Table 7.1: Fuel truck delivery delay distribution parameters and zonal grid outage 
probability 
 
Fig. 7.15 Fuel delivery truck delay distribution for Katrina  
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Fig. 7.16 Fuel delivery truck delay distribution for Ike 
 
Fig. 7.17.:  Fuel delivery truck delay distribution for Sandy 
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ICT site type TTC (hours) Tbatmin (hours) Tbatmax (hours)  
CO 72 6 12 
CS 24 4 8 
DLC 24 4 8 
Table 7.2: Fuel tank and Battery sizes for various ICT site type  
Hurricane County Zone pf Tr (days) 
Katrina Plaquemines 1,2 1 45 
Katrina St. Bernard 2 1 45 
Katrina Orleans 1 1 45 
Katrina St Tammany 3,4 0.8943 45 
Katrina St John 4 0.9944 45 
Ike  Chambers 1,2 1 19 
Ike Jefferson 1,2 1 10 
Ike Harris 3 0.9787 18 
Ike Orange 3 1 9 
Ike Galveston 2,3 0.9065 45 
Sandy Nassau 1,2 0.93 15 
Sandy Suffolk 1,2 0.76 14 
Sandy Manhattan 2 0.40 5 
Sandy Queens 2 0.18 13 
Sandy Staten island 1 0.70 9 
Table 7.3: Grid Outage Probabilities and Restoration times in various locations  
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Zone site TTC  Tbatmin   Tbatmax   Ugen Ubatmin Ubatmax Umin Umax 
1 CO 72 6 12 1 1 1 1 1 
1 CS 24 4 8 1 1 1 1 1 
1 DLC 24 4 8 1 1 1 1 1 
2 CO 72 6 12 1 1 1 1 1 
2 CS 24 4 8 1 1 1 1 1 
2 DLC 24 4 8 1 1 1 1 1 
3 CO 72 6 12 0.9583 0.9349 0.9063 0.925551 0.897237 
3 CS 24 4 8 1 1 1 0.99 0.99 
3 DLC 24 4 8 1 1 1 0.99 0.99 
4 CO 72 6 12 0.8 0.7031 0.6125 0.696069 0.606375 
4 CS 24 4 8 1 1 1 0.99 0.99 
4 DLC 24 4 8 1 1 1 0.99 0.99 
Table 7.4: Katrina Zonal Unavailabilities for various ICT site types  
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Zone site  TTC  Tbatmin   Tbatmax   Ugen Ubatmin Ubatmax Umin Umax 
1 CO 72 6 12 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 CS 24 4 8 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 DLC 24 4 8 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 CO 72 6 12 
0.9 0.8438 0.775 0.8438 0.775 
2 CS 24 4 8 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 DLC 24 4 8 
1 1 1 1 1 
3 CO 72 6 12 
0 0 0 0 0 
3 CS 24 4 8 
1 0.9861 0.9444 0.956517 0.916068 
3 DLC 24 4 8 
1 0.9861 0.9444 0.956517 0.916068 
Table 7.5: Ike Zonal Unavailabilities for various ICT site types  
 
Zone site TTC  Tbatmin   Tbatmax   Ugen Ubatmin Ubatmax Umin Umax 
1 CO 72 6 12 
0.9 0.8438 0.775 0.784734 0.72075 
1 CS 24 4 8 
1 1 1 0.93 0.93 
1 DLC 24 4 8 
1 1 1 0.93 0.93 
2 CO 72 6 12 
0.5 0.3828 0.2813 0.290928 0.213788 
2 CS 24 4 8 
1 0.9965 0.9861 0.75734 0.749436 
2 DLC 24 4 8 
1 0.9965 0.9861 0.75734 0.749436 
3 CO 72 6 12 
0 0 0 0 0 
3 CS 24 4 8 
1 0.9861 0.9444 0.49305 0.4722 
3 DLC 24 4 8 
1 0.9861 0.9444 0.49305 0.4722 
Table 7.6: Sandy Zonal Unavailabilities for various ICT site types 
Effects of cooling infrastructure on ICT site availability  
In Fig. 7.11 it can be seen that the connection of the cooling infrastructure in the 
power supply chain of the ICT site is before the batteries. This is usually the case in many 
ICT site facilities [Kwasinski et a. 2009][Ospina et al. 2014]. The additional autonomy 
 154 
provided by the battery is therefore unavailable to the cooling infrastructure. Therefore an 
additional failure mode exists wherein the failure of power to cooling infrastructure might 
lead to overheating of the facility and a failure may occur before the battery runs out of 
charge. This problem has been studied in past work such as [Kwasinski and Krien 
2007][Kwasinski 2008]. Since batteries are not powering the cooling infrastructure, the 
probability of failure of the power to the cooling infrastructure is calculated by setting 
Tbat to zero in (7.8). However failure of the air conditioner does not lead to an 
instantaneous failure of the telecommunication system due to overheating because of 
thermal inertia that is there is some time before the equipment overheats. The probability 
of failure of the ICT site due to failure of cooling infrastructure can be calculated if time 
to failure due to overheating time is known. Therefore the failure of the 
telecommunication equipment can occur at a time less than batTC
TT 
, therefore the 
unavailability estimate of (7.8) is a best case estimate of the telecommunication 
unavailability for the first refueling cycle. A more accurate calculation can be performed 
given the overheating time of the telecommunication equipment in the ICT facility.  Let 
Toh be the failure due to overheating time then the unavailability of the ICT site 
considering the overheating for Toh < Tbat is 
  
)( ohTCtruckfacgridsys TTTPpUUU      (14) 
Where Uac is the unavailability of the cooling system without the grid. 
Summary: 
This chapter presented case studies for the models developed for diesel genset 
fuel supply to study the characteristics of the ICT site power supply during hurricanes. 
Data and field observations form Katrina, Ike and Sandy for central offices, cells sites 
and DLCs were used in order to evaluate their performance based on the location and 
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operating condition the ICT sites were subjected to. In accordance with field 
observations, the ICT sites in the coastal regions result in high unavailability due to fuel 
starvation and battery depletion caused by long delays times in the fuel delivery. This 
indicates that present communication infrastructure equipped with traditional standby 
systems are not equipped to be resilient to hurricanes of the like of Katrina, Ike and 
Sandy.  Microgrids can be suitable solutions for improving power supply availability by 
providing a set of diverse sources and energy storage for the ICT site to use [Kwasinski et 
al 2012]. The models for microgrids have been developed to quantify the availability of 
microgrids in the presence of renewable energy sources such as photovoltaics and wind 
and diesel gensets with discontinuous fuel supply. Results from these models indicate 
that the power supply systems with high availability specifications are possible for 
critical loads such as ICT sites. The highly available microgrid planning is made feasible 
by these models as they quantitatively evaluate the microgrid availability under various 
operating conditions.  Using these availability models and the microgrid framework the 
ICT site availability might be improved. 
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Chapter 8: Summary, Conclusions and Future Work 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This dissertation presented models for evaluating the availability characteristics 
of various microgrid DERs in the presence of storage and lifelines dependencies. Chapter 
2 discussed the characterization of hurricane-caused power systems outages through 
localized tropical cyclone intensity indices. The analysis used an empirical statistical 
approach based on data from the 2004, 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons. Four outage 
metrics are defined for each county or parish: maximum outage incidence, 95% 
restoration time, 98% restoration time, and average outage duration. For each four indices 
, namely, the LTCIIMOI, LTCIITr95, LTCIITr98 and LTCIIAOD and for each outage metric 
O%max, Tr,95%, Tr,98% and M respectively derived. Using this data, Chapter 3 went on to 
derive the grid availability model during tropical cyclones wherein for each intensity of 
tropical cyclones the time dependent availability function of the grid was derived.  
Next, in Chapter 4, following a survey of various DERs of a microgrid the 
availability modeling of PV systems was discussed and the optimal storage sizing for a 
given availability constraint was presented using Markov chains models.  
Using similar Markov chains modeling ideas for storage, chapter 5 presented four 
models for deriving the power supply availability of diesel gensets with discontinuous 
fuel supply. The presence of storage was considered and its effect on fuel supply 
availability was analyzed for long and short delays in the fuel delivery process. The 
models for the fuel tank were developed for both deterministic and stochastic loads with 
fuel state independent and independent arrivals. The effect of controlling the fuel level at 
which the fuel order is placed was also found. The nominal tank autonomy was 
calculated for various load values. It was seen that with increasing storage, the genset 
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availability increased thereby reducing the dependency on the fuel truck delivery system.  
The improvement in availability was large for an increase in storage for small values of 
installed capacity. 
Using the models developed for the grid and for each of the DERs with storage 
developed from chapters 3 to 5, chapter 6 discussed the microgrid availability modeling 
for quantifying the availability of microgrid. The microgrid availability formulae for 
typical microgrid distribution architectures like the radial, ring and ladder architectures 
were derived. A diverse set of sources which include renewables, diesel genset and the 
main grid were considered in the availability calculations in the presence of storage and 
discontinuous fuel supply. It was shown that the radial availability formula can be used as 
a building block in order to derive the availability formulae for the ring and ladder 
networks. The power supply availability was calculated for typical values of grid failure 
and restoration characteristics observed during tropical cyclones. It was seen that the 
incorporation of storage and a diverse set of sources in the form of a microgrid can 
greatly improve power supply availability during extreme events like tropical cyclones 
when the microgrid goes into island mode. 
Finally, in chapter 7, three cases studies for ICT site behavior during hurricanes 
Katrina, Ike and Sandy were presented. It was seen that current backup systems are 
insufficient in providing sufficient availability performance for the ICT systems which 
leads to long restoration times and long down times of the ICT facility. The availability 
models hence developed might help design and plan microgrid with improved availability 
performance.  
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FUTURE WORK 
 The work presented in this dissertation is incipient in nature. Microgrids are 
growing in number of applications at the present time. With evolving structure and 
control strategies in the microgrid, the models in this dissertation will have to be adapted 
to specific applications. The introduction of intelligent controls will also seek to improve 
microgrid availability therefore developing availability models based on such control 
strategies is a logical next step for this research. Other possibilities include extending 
these models to a network of microgrids where in energy sharing is possible, such models 
will be typical large and computationally intensive and hence developing approximations 
to evaluating microgrid performance need to be developed. 
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